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‘It is difficult to contemplate a more central topic in maritime law than time charter-parties. 
They occupy a prominent position in commercial shipping with the greater part of the world 
fleet engaged to some degree under the terms of a time charter-party.’ 
Professor D. Rhidian Thomas 
 
‘SA dogs of war versus Somali pirates’. 
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BALTIME   The BALTIME 1939 (rev 2001) standard form issued by BIMCO. 
BIMCO   The Baltic and International Maritime Council. 
BOXTIME   
 
The Baltic and International Maritime Council Uniform Time 
Charter Party for Container Vessels. This is a standard form issued 
by BIMCO. 
BPTIME 3     
 
The BPTIME 3 standard form, 1st Edition, February 2001, issued by 
BP Shipping Ltd and BIMCO. 
CONWARTIME 93 CONWARTIME is a clause issued by BIMCO. 
CONWARTIME 2004 CONWARTIME is a clause issued by BIMCO.  
GENEVA CONVENTION 1958 Geneva High Seas Convention done at Geneva on 29 April 
1958. 
GENTIME  General Time Charter Party issued by BIMCO. 
GOA      Gulf of Aden Clause issued by Cargill.  
H&M          Hull & Machinery. 
INTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker Owners. 
IMB    International Maritime Bureau. 
K&R    Kidnap & Ransom. 
NYPE 46 
 
The New York Produce Exchange (NYPE 46) Charterparty issued 
by ABSATIME. 
NYPE 93       
 
The New York Produce Exchange (NYPE 93) Charterparty issued 
by ASBATIME. 
SHELLTIME 4  
 
Standard Charter Party issued December 1984 and amended 
December 2003 by the Royal Dutch Shell Company Limited. 















CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION 
 
I AIM OF DISSERTATION 







clauses have improved the position of time charterers by distributing the risk of delay or 
deviation caused by pirate attacks, or the threat of such attacks on their time chartered 
vessels, more equitably as between the vessel owner and the time charterer 
4
 with a view to 
alerting particularly South African time charterers to their vulnerability under many standard 
form charter contracts and therefore the need to incorporate appropriate clauses, as well as 
cautioning against the indiscriminate adoption of such clauses.  
 
Standard off-hire clauses benefit the charterer by suspending the obligation to pay hire, 
but usually do not include piracy as an off-hire cause.
5
 The piracy clauses serve to shift some 
of the risk of piracy away from the charterer, while the war risk clauses consolidate into a 
single provision the contractual position of the parties in relation to the threat of piracy, 
                                                 
1
 Off-hire clauses suspend the obligation to pay hire in the circumstances and to the extent prescribed by the 
clause- see Professor D. Rhidian Thomas (ed) Legal Issues Relating to Time Charterparties (2008) 135 
(‘Rhidian Thomas’). 
2
 War and war risk clauses (dealt with as one in this dissertation) regulate the position of the parties where the 
causative occurrence of “war risks” prevents or impedes the ability of the parties operationally to carry out the 
charter in the terms agreed- see Professor Keith Michel ‘War terror, piracy and frustration in a time charter 
context’ in Rhidian Thomas 206 (‘Keith Michel’).   
3
 As explained by BIMCO, piracy clauses constitute a ‘comprehensive contractual provision dealing with rights, 
obligations, responsibilities, liabilities and costs related to piracy under a time charter’- see BIMCO Special 
Circular No 2 November 2009, Version 1.1, 4-10-2011 at 3 available at 
www.bimco.org/en/Chartering/~/media/Chartering/Special_Circulars/SC2009_02.ashx. BIMCO is an acronym 
for the Baltic and International Maritime Council. It is responsible for drafting standard forms and clauses for 
the shipping industry- see Grant Hunter Standard forms – the BIMCO experience  in Rhidian Thomas 1 (‘Grant 
Hunter’). 
4
 The terms ‘owner’ and ‘charterer’ are used for ease of exposition because similar considerations would apply 
as between a time charterer and sub-time charterer (respectively ‘owner’ and ‘charterer’ in a sub-time charter).    
5
 For example, the NYPE 1946 does not specifically include piracy as an off-hire event. NYPE is an acronym 












sometimes also broadening the scope of piracy.
6
 The incorporation of these piracy and war 
risk clauses does not remove the time charterer’s risk entirely, and time charterers should 
therefore consider additional measures, such as ensuring the safety of the vessel before 
departure,
7
 proceeding in convey, providing armed guards,
8
 using escorts, avoiding day or 
night navigation, and adjusting speed or course.
9
 This dissertation intentionally does not 
address these additional preventative measures.  
 
II BACKGROUND TO AIM 
The ways in which time charterers can limit their risk under the terms of their time charter 
agreement is worth considering because widespread use is made of standard-form time 
charter agreements that were drafted before the resurgence of piracy in recent times,
10
 and 
that, in some instances, have not been adapted to deal with the allocation of risks of piracy as 
                                                 
6
 Sara Cockerill ‘Shipowners’ and charterers’ concerns regarding their contractual obligations. Charterparty 
Issues: The legal backdrop, CONWARTIME, and the new piracy clauses’ in LSLC event-Piracy II 15 March 
2010 (‘Sara Cockerill’). CONWARTIME is the code name for the BIMCO ‘Standard War Risks Clause for 
Time Charters, 1993’. For example, the BIMCO piracy clause introduces a 90 day cap on the payment of hire 
should the ship be seized by pirates- see BIMCO Special Circular No 2 November 2009, Version 1.1, 4-10-2011 
at 3.       
7
 ‘It can include installing barbed wire and employing armed guards’- see Andrei Kharchanka (BC Chartering) 
‘Impact of Piracy on Terms and Conditions of Charterparties’ available at http://www.joc.com/sites/ 
default/files/joc_inc/breakbulk/bba2011_presentations/Panel3b+piracy+andreikharchanka.pdf, accessed on 14 
November 2012 (’Andrei Kharchanka’).  
8
 Ince and Company, in a client briefing, make the following comment on the use of armed guards: ‘Companies 
who provide armed guards to vessels report brisk business in the wake of The Maersk Alabama and there is no 
doubt that this is being increasingly looked at by some shipowners. The incident involving The MSC Melody 
perhaps suggests that the pirates are not deterred from attacking ships with armed guards on board; certainly it is 
in their character to meet fire with fire. The basic equation therefore remains: use armed guards and decrease the 
chances of being taken against a risk of escalation and damage to the vessel and injury to crew’- see Ince and 
Company, available at http://incelaw.com/whatwedo/shipping/article/shipping-e-brief-may-2009/piracy-an-
overview-and-update, accessed on 15 June 2103. 
9
 BIMCO Special Circular No. 2 November 2009, Version 1.1, 4-10-2011 at 2; referring to the BIMCO Piracy 
Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009, Clause (c) (i).   
10
 ‘The NYPE (Appendix G.10) 1993, formulated by the Association of Shipbrokers and Agents (USA) Inc. and 
recommended by BIMCO and FONASBA, is the current latest draft of the NYPE. But the form that remains in 
the most common use is the 1946 NYPE (Appendix G.9)’- see Professor John Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty 
Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 748 (‘John Hare’). FONASBA is the Federation of National 












between the parties to the time charter (these will be referred to, for want of a better term, as 
‘traditional charters’).
11
 The use of these traditional charters generally means that under these 
contracts the risk of delay is carried entirely by the charterer, because the clauses in these 
traditional charters that generally shift risks of delay, such as off-hire provisions,
12
 do not, as 




Provided time charterers are aware of the limitations of such clauses under these 
traditional charters, they can go some way to limit their exposure by including in their 
charters appropriate piracy clauses
14
 developed in recent times; make use of more recently 
drafted versions of the widely used standard-form agreements that do contain clauses adapted 
to balancing the risks of pirate attacks between shipowner and time charterer; or introduce 
bespoke clauses to achieve that balance.   
 
South African time charterers, who, with the resurgence of piracy on the east coast of 
Africa are perhaps particularly vulnerable to increased costs and losses occasioned by 
piracy,
15
 would be well-advised to be aware of their weak contractual position under the 
                                                 
11
 Professor Hare in his book Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed mentions piracy only 
once, and then in the context of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 and the Admiralty Court 
Rules, 1997. ‘The Act regards piracy, sabotage or terrorism committed against maritime property or against 
persons on any ship as giving rise to a maritime claim’: John Hare 70. ‘When Maritime piracy resurfaced as a 
front-page story, many readers greeted it with surprise and even derision’: Robert Haywood & Roberta Spivak 
Maritime Piracy (2012) 6. 
12
 Also referred to as ‘Suspension of Hire’ or ‘Loss of Time’ in some standard charterparties – see for example 
clause 11 of the BALTIME 1939 (Revised 2001) form which is headed ‘Suspension of Hire etc.’ and clause 8 
(e)  of the BOXTIME form which is headed ‘Loss of Time’. BALTIME is an abbreviation for The Baltic Time 
Charter issued by BIMCO, and BOXTIME is an abbreviation for The Baltic and International Maritime Council 
Uniform Time Charter Party for Container Vessels also issued by BIMCO – see BIMCO Special Circular No 2 
November 2009, Version 1.1, 4-10-2011 at 2.    
13
 Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Team-Up Owning Co Ltd (The Saldanha) [2010] EWHC 1340 (Comm) para 12. 
Here the court held that an act of piracy was not an event leading to off-hire under the NYPE 46 form.   
14
 Piracy provisions are usually incorporated into the war or war risk clauses of standard charterparty forms. But 
there are some standard charterparty forms which do not allocate piracy risk, such as SHELLTIME 4- see 
Chapter VIII of this dissertation. SHELLTIME 4 is the standard time charter form issued by the Royal Dutch 
Shell Company for the tanker trade.      
15
 ‘The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy’ Working Paper One, Earth Future Foundation available at 












traditional charters and to follow suit by including appropriate clauses in their time charter 
agreements. However care needs to be taken to select the right clause(s) as not all standard-
form agreements or clauses advance the charterer’s interests in the event of loss of time 
caused by piracy. This dissertation is intended to provide some guidance to time charterers in 
this regard and is therefore considered to be a worthwhile endeavour.   
 
The charterer’s position (in attempting to more equitably distribute the risk of piracy) is 
neatly summed up by Andrei Kharchanka as follows
16
 
‘Negotiating right clauses in the charter party will not prevent pirate’s attacks, but it can 
balance owner’s and charterer's interests and avoid any legal battles if the vessel is seized.’ 
 
III PIRACY AND INSURANCE 
Insurance is a key component of the time charterer’s contractual management of risk, 
including mitigating the liability for loss of time due to delay or deviation. A discussion about 
insurance (which can be traced back to the earliest days of shipping) falls outside the scope of 
this dissertation. However it is appropriate to make a few comments about the intersection of 
piracy and insurance. If commercially available, and beneficial, the charterer should consider 
arranging insurance cover
17
 to mitigate the exposure to piracy.
18
 Jonathan Webb (a practising 
shipping lawyer), in a recent article on the Maritime Law Association of South Africa’s 
website, describes the current situation regarding marine insurance as follows: 
‘On a standard London marine policy written on Institute Time Clauses (Hulls) 
(1/10/83), piracy is a hull and machinery (H&M) risk and excluded from standard war 
risks policy under the Institute War and Strikes Clauses 1/10/83. However, nowadays, 
piracy is almost always expressly excluded from H&M policies and expressly included 
in war policies. It is generally agreed that the peril of piracy fits best in a war policy, 
which is much more versatile and allows underwriters to rate the risk of a specific transit 
                                                                                                                                                        
that piracy may result in excess costs of having a ship held hostage for months on end, potentially as large as 
$20 million for a $4 million ransom.   
16
 Andrei Kharchanka 4. 
17
 Piracy is an insured peril. Professor Michel notes that ‘Insurers in late 2005 recommended that “piracy” 
should no longer be classified as a hull risk…but as a “war risk” under the Institute War and Strikes Clauses 
1/11/95 edition’: Keith Michel 202.    
18
 ‘Charterers are routinely required to fund shipowner’s insurance premiums, whether through express 
provision to that effect or simply because the cost of insurance is reflected in the hire rate’: Professor Howard 












much more effectively through the use of Additional Premiums. It is rare to see piracy 
remain in an H&M policy under London Institute wordings, but it does still happen and it 
is very important to check the peril is properly covered. ... Over the last three years we 
have seen a large increase in the popularity of bespoke Kidnap & Ransom (K&R) 
policies designed to provide primary cover for losses arising from a hijack – often 




Appropriate clauses equitably distributing the risk of piracy (i.e. improving the 
charterer’s position from the norm) may therefore also have the additional benefit of 
decreasing insurance premiums paid by time charterers because of the realignment of risk. 
 
IV STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
First, Chapter II of the dissertation (‘Piracy and modern shipping’) explains the need for the 
contractual management of piracy risk, and therefore demonstrates the topicality and 
usefulness of the dissertation, and provides various definitions of piracy distinguishing it 
from war, terrorism and violence.  
 
Secondly, Chapter III (‘General Time Charter Arrangements’) ‘sets the scene’ by 
outlining general time charter arrangements, including the contractual nature of the time 
charterparty, the time charterers obligation to pay hire and right to set-off.  
 
Thirdly, Chapter IV (‘Classifying the causes of delay or deviation’) looks at a number 
of events which can cause the vessel to be delayed or deviated, and attempts to classify them 
into causes internal or extraneous to the ship. This is useful background to the discussion on 
off-hire clauses which follows.     
 
Fourthly, Chapter V (‘Historical development of off-hire, war risk and piracy clauses’) 
provides an overview of the development and maturity of off-hire, war risk and piracy 
clauses demonstrating the different periods within which relevant changes occurred to the 
standard charter forms. This shows ‘why we are where we are’ by providing some context for 
the clauses and indicates the options available to charterparties.   
                                                 
19
 Jonathan Webb ‘Piracy: The Current Position – An overview’ available at www.mlasa.co.za/wp-













Fifthly, Chapter VI (‘The off-hire clauses in time charterparties’) sets out a general 
overview of the off-hire clauses (including their purpose and operation) and then reviews 
more specifically the off-hire clauses in the traditional charters and compares the clauses 
selected.   
 
Sixthly, Chapter VII (‘Piracy and the off-hire clauses’), building on the background in 
the previous chapter, then considers how the risk of delay or deviation resulting from a pirate 
attack or the threat of a pirate attack would be allocated as between the shipowner and time 
charterer under clauses in the traditional charters dealing with off-hire. The conclusion is that 
there is a higher level of risk allocated to the time charterer.   
 
Seventhly, Chapter VIII (‘Impact of recent off-hire, war risk and piracy clauses’) 
examines the more recent off-hire clauses as well as recent developments in introducing war 
risk and piracy clauses into these contractual arrangements to establish whether the risk of 
delays or deviation have been allocated more equitably as between the shipowner and time 
charterer and in so doing to provide the time charterer with a greater measure of protection 
against losses occasioned by delays or deviation due to piracy.  
 
Eighthly, and for completeness, Chapter IX (‘Damages due to delay on redelivery’) 
briefly addresses the issue of damages (either contractually or under common law) which 
owners may claim as a result of a loss of hire or fixture resulting from the vessel’s delay due 
to detention by pirates. The risks of losses being suffered by a time charterer as a result of 
delay caused by piracy are both liability for hire while the vessel is not ‘working’ and 
potential damages for breach of the obligation to redeliver at the stipulated time. The chapter 
discusses how the latter risk is managed contractually in the standard time charter 
agreements.   
 
Finally, Chapter X draws conclusions about whether the recent off-hire, war risk, and 
piracy clauses have improved the time charterer’s position. The conclusion is that it is a 
mixed-bag, and emphasises that the risk of piracy for the charterer has not been entirely 












CHAPTER II  PIRACY AND MODERN SHIPPING 
This chapter discusses the need for the contractual management of piracy risk in modern 
shipping, thereby providing the relevance for the dissertation topic, and further explains the 
rationale for defining piracy and distinguishing it from other causes, such as war, terrorism 
and violence.   
 
I RISK OF PIRACY  
Piracy is a growing global issue in modern times and has even been classified as an 
‘epidemic’.
20
 Pirates impede shipping and maritime transport in a number of locations across 
the globe ‘such as the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Nigeria, the South China Sea, the Straits 
of Malacca and the Americas’.
21
 Given the fact that ‘more than 90 percent of global trade is 
carried by sea’,
22
 and the value of cargo carried on board modern vessels, the commercial 
impact of piracy on the shipping industry is enormous. Niclas Dahlvang quantifies this as 
follows: 
‘The cost of piracy to the world economy has been estimated as high as $25 billion each 
year. However, this does not tell the whole story, as under-reporting of pirate attacks has 




Increasing risk of piracy
24
 is theref re unfortunately an eventuality which South 
African time charterers must consider.
25
 Already shipping has had to be diverted elsewhere to 
                                                 
20
 Eugene Kontorvich “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists’ (2010) 
98 Cal LR 243 at 248.  
21
 Lucas Bento ‘Towards an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy 
Law Enables Piracy to Flourish’ (2011) 29 Berkley Journal of International Law 399 at 404.  
22
 Helmut Tuerk ‘The Resurgence of Piracy: A Phenomenon of Modern Time’ (2009) 17 U Miami Int'l & Comp 
L Rev 1 at 3. An estimated 22 000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden every year- see Gitanjali Bakshi: Blue 
Gold-Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden available at http://www.strategicforesight.com/blue_gold.htm, accessed 
on 11 July 2012 (‘Helmut Tuerk’). 
23
 Niclas Dahlvang ‘Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st Century’ (2006) 4 Regent J Int'l L 17 at 
17 (‘Niclas Dahlvang’). 
24
 The advertising street billboards for the Johannesburg-based Mail & Guardian newspaper on 11 June 2013 
screamed: ‘SA dogs of war versus Somali pirates’. 
25
 ‘Damage to ship or cargo incurred in the attack, loss of hire, cargo and operation during the attack and 
investigation procedures as well as loss of the whole ship as a cause of hijacking, kidnap and ransom money for 












and from eastern and southern Africa. By way of example, South Africa’s profitable coal 
export market to India has been drastically reduced as ‘Indian coal buyers have now started 
buying coal from Australia and Russia to avoid the Indian Ocean, citing piracy as the 
reason’.
26
 Time charterers therefore have a commercial interest in considering whether these 
recent war risk and piracy clauses on offer may mitigate or partly mitigate their risk of piracy.   
 
II DEFINING AND DISTINGUISHING PIRACY 
Having established that piracy is something time charterers’ need to be worried about, it is 
also convenient to briefly distinguish piracy from war, terrorism, violence or robbery. 
Although the outcome of this dissertation does not hang on this distinction, classifying an 
event into one or other of the categories mentioned can have insurance and other contractual 
implications. A few examples will suffice. The hijack of a vessel off the Nigerian coast for 
political motives may not be covered under a bespoke piracy clause (for loss of hire). An 
attack on a vessel by Al Shabaab (ie an act of terrorism) off Somalia would probably fall 
outside the ‘War clause’ in the NYPE 93 (clause 31(e)), but within the definition of ‘War 
Risks’ in the BIMCO CONWARTIME 93 (clause (1)(b) (which includes both ‘acts of 
terrorists’ and ‘acts of piracy’). Conversely ‘civil commotions’ leading to violence would be 
covered under the SHELLTIME 4 ‘War Risks’ clause, but piracy would not.  
 
How then is piracy defined? As Paul Todd explains, ‘Piracy has many different legal 
consequences, but though there is a central concept, there is no single definition of piracy for 
all purposes’.
27
 Countries have therefore expanded the concept of piracy to include the broad 
notion of ‘any armed violence at sea which is not a lawful act of war’.
28
 Jonathan Bruce 
                                                                                                                                                        
to delayed or damaged delivery as well as cargo fraud with phantom - or ghost-ships are just some of the 
mounting costs South African charters face if confronted with a pirate attack’: Leonard Remondus van der 
Meijden The Influence of Maritime Piracy on Modern Commercial Transport (unpublished MSc Thesis, 
University Rotterdam, 2008) (‘Leonard Remondus van der Meijden’). Also see Ademun Odeke ‘Somali Piracy 
– Effects on Oceanborne Commerce and Regional Security and Challenges to International Law and World 
Order’ (2011) 25 A&NZ Mar LJ 134 at 139. 
26
 Editorial on Somalian Piracy ‘Escalating threat spurs South Africa into action’ available at 
http://www.leadershiponline.co.za/articles/politics/1318 accessed on 16 July 2012.  
27
 Paul Todd Maritime Fraud and Piracy 2ed (2010) 3 (‘Paul Todd’).    
28












refers to the classic definition of a pirate in Republic of Bolivia v Indemnity Mutual Mar Ass 
Co Ltd (1909) 1 K.B. 785 which is: 
‘A man who is plundering indiscriminately for his own ends, and not a man who is 
simply operating against the property of a particular state for a public end, the end of 
establishing a government, although that act may be illegal and even criminal, and 




The first internationally accepted attempt to define piracy was in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas (‘Geneva Convention’).
30
 This definition was encompassed in 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’)
31
 which is 
recognised as ‘the best evidence of international law relating to the maritime regime, and is 
therefore binding on all nations’.
32
 Under this convention, to be considered an act of piracy, 
four criteria must be met, namely: (1) be committed on the high seas, (2) be of a violent 
                                                 
29
 Jonathan Bruce ‘Piracy: whose risk is it anyway?’ in Foremast, the newsletter of the Elborne Mitchell Marine, 
Aviation and Energy Group, Elborne Mitchell Solicitors. Edition 2009–22. 1 at 1. The claimants in this case 
(Republic of Bolivia v Indemnity Mutual Mar Ass Co Ltd 1909 1 K.B. 785) tried to bring an act of piracy within 
the confines of an insurance policy.  
30
 See Art 1 of the 1958 Geneva High Seas Convention done at Geneva on 29 April 1958. This convention 
entered into force on 30 September 1962. 
31
 Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as follows: 
‘Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed -  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts 
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)’. 
 Referenced from ‘Piracy and armed Robbery at sea’ available at http://www.imo.org/knowledgecentre/ 
informationresourcesoncurrenttopics/informationresourcesoncurrenttopicsarchives/documents/piracy.pdf 
accessed on 12 July 2012. This definition of piracy has been the subject of much criticism - see Robin Geiβ and 
Anna Petrig Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea – The Legal Framework for Counter Piracy Operations in 
Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (2011) 59-64. 
32
 Milena Sterio ‘Fighting Piracy In Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed’ (2010) 33 Fordham Int'l 












nature, (3) include at least two vessels, and (4) be committed for solely private aims’.
33
 A 
wider definition can be found in the International Maritime Bureau (‘IMB’) which defines 
piracy as ‘an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to 
commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in 
furtherance of that act’.
34
 The UNCLOS definition has not been used extensively in a private 
and contractual context as its definition is limited due to its restrictive requirements (such as 
the high seas’ requirement).    
 
It is sometimes difficult to classify an attack as one of terrorism or piracy, the lines 
often becoming blurred. As Professor Michel notes: 
‘Attacks in recent years on merchant vessels including cruise ships and ferries in 
international waters or in ill-defined and unpoliced coastal regions have caused concern 
as to whether such attacks are perpetrated by “pirates” seeking “personal” gain by theft 
or the taking of hostages or by “terrorists” seeking a political or religious end. Who is to 
say that the demand for a cash ransom is made by a local warlord, a criminal syndicate or 




Professor Michel goes on to explain that the definition of ‘war’ has evolved through 
judicial interpretation, where the courts have adopted a common sense approach, whereas 
‘terrorism’ has evolved through statutory enactment, such as the UK Terrorism Act 2000.
36
 
The ultimate aim of terrorism is usually to advance a political, religious or idealogical cause. 
The South African Terrorism Act adopts a similar approach – ‘terrorist activity’ is defined 
(paraphased) as the use of iolence which endangers the life or causes serious risk to the 
health or safety of the public and which is intended to threaten the unity or territorial integrity 
of the Republic or to intimidate the public and which is committed for the purpose of 
advancement of an individual or collective political, religious, idealogical or philisophical 
                                                 
33
 Milena Sterio 386.  
34
 Michael Gagain ‘Neglected Waters: Territorial Maritime Piracy and Developing States: Somalia, Nigeria, and 
Indonesia’ (2010) 16 New Eng J Int'l & Comp L 169 at 171. This definition of piracy includes acts within a 
state’s territory.  
35
 Keith Michel 202.  
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motive, objective, cause or undertaking.
37
 The common type of hijack of a vessel by pirates 
would therefore not constitute ‘terrorism’ under South African law.   
 
The more recent trend is for the standard forms and piracy clauses to contain broad 
definitions, reducing and sometimes eliminating the (legal) distinction between piracy, 
terrorism, violence and robbery. For example, the CONWARTIME 2004 ‘War Risks’ clause 
includes ‘acts of piracy by any person, body, terrorist or political group’. Similarly ‘violent 
robbery’ is deemed to be ‘an act of piracy’ under the BIMCO 2009 piracy clause
38
 and the 
GOA clause ‘excludes liability for capture/seizure ... detention or threatened detention by 
third parties ... not limited to acts of piracy’.  
 
III CONCLUSION 
Piracy is a real threat which time charterers need to take into account when considering their 
risk mitigation strategies. The outcome of this dissertation is to provide time charterers with 
some commercial guidance in this regard. Categorising a particular event of hijack as piracy 
can sometimes be difficult, because it is not always clear that it falls within the language of a 
particular clause, and this can have insurance and contractual implications for the time 
charterer.   
                                                 
37
 Section 1(i) (XXV) of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities 
Act 33 of 2004 (The Terrorism Act). Published in Government Gazette 27266 dated 11 February 2005.  
38
 The BIMCO piracy clause (clause (a)) defines “Piracy” as ‘any actual, threatened or reported acts of piracy 
and/or violent robbery and/or capture/seizure’. This is a superfluity as ‘piracy’ itself is not actually defined. 
However this definition of piracy is wide enough to include attacks by pirates seeking personal gain as well as 












CHAPTER III GENERAL TIME CHARTER ARRANGEMENTS 
This chapter outlines the general time charter arrangements, focussing on the nature of the 
time charter, the time charterer’s obligation to pay hire and his right to set-off.  This will 
serve as background context to the following chapters of the dissertation where the allocation 
of the risk of delay or deviation leading to off-hire is reviewed, both under the traditional 
charters as well as the more recent war risk and piracy clauses, to show the allocation of risk 
assumed by the shipowner and time charterer.  
 
I  NATURE OF THE CHARTERPARTY 
Professor Hare states that by convention the law has categorised charterparties into various 
types, primarily charters by demise, time charterparties and voyage charterparties (of which 
the latter two are sometimes grouped together as non-demise charterparties).
39
 There is a 
fundamental difference in the nature of the contract between charters by demise and charters 
not by demise.
40
 There is further a need for various purposes to differentiate within charters 
not by demise between voyage and time charters. This dissertation intentionally only 
addresses time charter arrangements as its primary focus. This is considered useful because 
time charters are the most common arrangement in South African shipping
41
 and, with the 
increasing piracy risk faced by parties, the distribution of the risk of delay or deviation caused 
by pirate attacks, or the threat of such attacks, is pertinent.    
 
Characterising the nature of a time charter is not an easy matter in South African law. It 
is clearly a contract of hire. But there is an on-going debate as to whether the charterparty is 
also a lease or a contract of carriage.
42
 A lease generally transfers the possession and control 
                                                 
39
 John Hare 737-8. 
40
 In the demise charter, the demise charterer hires the entire ship, usually without provision of master, officers 
and crew. The demise charterer takes possession and control of the vessel ‘bareboat’, and then employs the 
shipboard personnel as its own servants to operate the vessel- see John Hare 738.  As explained in this chapter 
of the dissertation, the time charterer under the standard forms contracts with the owner for the exclusive use of 
the cargo carrying spaces on board a ship for a fixed time period- see John Hare 746. The time charterer does 
not take control of the ship which remains under the control of the ship owner at all times.  
41
 John Hare 734. 
42
 In Montelindo Compania Naviera SA v the Bank of Lisbon & SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 127 (W), the Witwatersrand 
Local Division held that the time charter was a lease (for the purposes of the Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936). 












of the thing leased, which does not occur under a (standard) time charter. Why is this 
categorisation important? As Professor Hare explains: 
‘Categorisation can be more than mere rhetoric. For the law may ascribe differing 
consequences to differing types of contracts, and, where the parties have not covered 
themselves adequately in the contractual terms, it may be that the law is required to step 




Perhaps Professor Hare’s view that a time charter is a contract sui generis is the 
appropriate conclusion.
44
 He accordingly defines a charterparty as follows:  
‘A charterparty is an agreement in terms of which a charterer hires from a shipowner part or 
the whole of a ship, with or without her non-cargo carrying space, and with or without master 





As the definition suggests, there can be a wide range of charterparty agreements.
46
 The 
main contractual rights and obligations of the parties to the time charterparty are as follows: 
 
Shipowner 
(i) Hires part or the whole of a ship to the charterer. 
(ii) Receives payment for the hire from the charterer. 
(iii)‘Remains responsible for the navigation of the vessel, acts of pilots and tug boats, 
insurance, crew and all other matters, same as when trading for their own account’.
47
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Richmond Maritime Corporation (Ideomar SA intervening) 1985 (2) SA 476 (C), held that there was no lease of 
the vessel under the NYPE 46 time charter agreement. John Hare, in proposing a pragmatic commercial 
approach, concludes that ‘the apparent divergence of approach between Montelindo and The Maria K is in fact 
reconcilable if one accepts as a valid proposition of South African law that a contract for the letting and hiring 
of services (such as a time charterparty undoubtedly includes) may be a lease in itself. A time charterparty in 
South African law may therefore incorporate a lease, though it is not usually regarded as a lease of a ship, and it 
should not necessarily be so regarded’: John Hare 734.           
43
 John Hare 730. 
44
 John Hare 747. 
45
 John Hare 730. 
46
 ‘Charterparties, at least in modern practice, may take any form which reflects the intention and consensus of 












(iv) Bears the expense of maintaining the ship and the crew.48 
 
Time Charterer 
(i) Acquires the right to use the vessel’s cargo spaces for the carriage of lawful49 cargo.50 
(ii) Pays for the hire of part or the whole of the ship (as agreed through negotiation).51 




(iv) Does not employ any of the on-board ship’s personnel53 
 
II OBLIGATION TO PAY HIRE IN CHARTERPARTY 
The time charterparty gives to the charterer the right to employ the vessel for the charterer’s 
own gain upon payment of a time-based charter hire to the owner.
54
 The time charterer 
therefore has the obligation to pay hire. As Professor Rhidian Thomas states, ‘It is trite that 
hire is the consideration provided by the charterers for the use of the vessel and her crew 
made available by the owners’.
55
 The threshold rule is that ‘hire shall be payable from the 
moment the ship is delivered to the charterers until she is again redelivered to the owners at 
the termination of the charter period’.
56
 Time runs against the charterer
57
 who assumes 
responsibility for paying hire continuously from delivery to the vessel’s re-delivery. If the 
vessel is delayed beyond the period (term) originally agreed, the charterer is liable for the 
delay. Thus the court held in the Hill Harmony that ‘it was true that “time was money” for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
47
 Clause 26 of the NYPE charterparty, 1993. Professor Hare states that the NYPE charterparty is most 
commonly used in the trade- see John Hare 734. 
48
 Professor Hare refers to the case of Whistler International Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The Hill 
Harmony) [2001] 1 AC 638 at 652 per Lord Hobhouse- see John Hare 747. 
49
 NYPE 46 clauses 4 and 5. 
50
 John Hare 733. 
51
 Hire is paid, generally in United States Dollars, calculated on a daily basis and payable monthly in advance: 
NYPE clauses 10 and 11: John Hare 750.   
52
 John Hare 733. 
53
 John Hare 733. 
54
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55
 Rhidian Thomas 115.  
56
 Lars Gorton, Patrick Hillenius, Rolf Ihre et al. Shipbroking and Chartering Practice 6 ed (2004) 273 (‘Lars 
Gorton’).  
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 The liability for such hire accrues during the charter period, generally regardless 
of whether the ship is actually ‘working’ or not. This is different to the voyage charter where 
it is the owner who is at risk from additional time taken.
59
 Professor Rhidian Thomas puts it 





In practice a negotiated hire rate is agreed between shipowner and charterer. ‘This hire 
rate is usually a daily rate based on the ship’s tonnage’.
61
 The hire is usually paid monthly or 
semi-monthly, but this can be changed by agreement.  
 
The general obligation placed on a charterer to tender payment is absolute, continuous 
and unconditional. Lord Wright expressed this obligation in The Petrofina:
62
   
‘The payment of hire was a vital matter because, if there was default of "such payment" 
(i.e. in cash monthly in advance in London), the owners were entitled to cancel the long 
and valuable charter. Default in payment, that is, on the due date is not, in my opinion, 
excused by accident or inadvertence. The duty to pay is unqualified so far as the express 
terms of the charterparty go. The importance of this advance payment to be made by the 
charterers is that it is the substance of the consideration given to the shipowner for the 
use and service of the ship and crew which the shipowner agrees to give. He is entitled to 
have the periodical payment as stipulated in advance of his performance so long as the 
charterparty continues. Hence the stringency of his right to cancel.’ 
 
Failure to pay hire or the delay in the payment of hire will constitute a breach of 
contract by the charterer. The shipowner may have a claim for breach of contract and 
damages, as well as a right to withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterer if payment 
of hire is delayed.     
 
                                                 
58
 Whistler International Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The Hill Harmony) [1999] 2 AC 219.  
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 John Hare 768.  
60
 Rhidian Thomas 116.  
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 ‘The “prima facie” rule is that hire must be paid in full unless a contractual or legal right of deduction exists’: 
Rhidian Thomas 115. 
62
 A/S Tankexpress v Compagnie Financiere Belge Des Petroles SA (The Petrofina) [1948] 2 All ER 939 at 946. 













III RIGHT TO WITHOLD PAYMENT AND SET-OFF IN TIME 
CHARTERPARTIES 
The right to withhold payment would generally conflict with the charterer’s obligation to 
‘pay for both the use and hire of the ship from the day of her delivery until the hour of the 
day of her re-delivery’.
63
 This proposition is similar to the lease of immovable property 
where the tenant is usually precluded from withholding payment of rent for any reason. 
Under the traditional charters, neither the NYPE 46 nor the BALTIME 1939 clauses give the 
charterer the contractual right to withhold payment. 
 
Set-off in this context can be seen as the right of the charterer to deduct claims against 
the owner.
64
 Professor Tettenborn remarks that ‘A time charterer’s scope for set-offs against 
hire is not insubstantial …’.
65
 The rule is stated by John Kimball as follows: 
‘Generally, under both English and American law, deductions from hire are not 
permitted unless expressly allowed in the charter. Unauthorised deductions, or 
deductions exceeding the proper amount, may be treated the same as non-payment’.
66
   
 
Professor Hare, after reviewing the legal position, concludes that, in order to set-off, 
‘there must either be a contractual right to do so
67
 or the quantum must be agreed or 




A review of the traditional charters shows that there are a number of contractual 
circumstances where the charterer can set-off additional costs incurred against hire charges. 
By way of example, clause 15 of the NYPE 46 provides as follows: 
                                                 
63
 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46. Clause 6 of the BALTIME 1939 provides that ‘The Charterers shall pay as hire the 
rate stated in Box 19 per 30 days, commencing in accordance with Clause 1 until her re-delivery to the Owners’. 
The clause goes on to say that ‘In default of payment, the Owners shall have the right of withdrawing the vessel 
from the services of the Charterers…’.  
64
 Professor Andrew Tettenborn. ‘Assignees of hire: how far can they ignore charterer’s claims against owners?’ 
in Rhidian Thomas 155 (‘Andrew Tettenborn’). 
65
 Andrew Tettenborn 151.    
66
 John D Kimball ‘Termination of rights under time charters’ in Rhidian Thomas 221. This is similar to the 
lease of immovable property where the tenant is precluded from setting off the payment of rent against any debt 
owed by the landlord (‘John Kimball’).   
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 Such as contained in the deduction provisions of the off-hire clause in the NYPE 93.  
68












“15. Off Hire 
That in the event of the loss of time from … the payment of hire shall cease from the time 
thereby lost; and if upon the voyage the speed be reduced by defect in or any breakdown of any 
part of her hull, machinery or equipment, the time so lost, and the cost of any extra fuel 
consumed in consequence thereof, and all extra expenses shall be deducted from the hire.” 
[Emphasis added] 
 
Therefore in terms of this off-hire clause, charterers can deduct (set-off) extra expenses 
incurred against the agreed hire under the circumstances reflected in the clause.    
 
Clause 11 of the BALTIME 1939 provides as follows: 
“11. Suspension of Hire etc.   
(A) In the event of drydocking or other necessary measures …  no hire shall be paid in 
respect of any time lost thereby during the period in which the Vessel is unable to 
perform the service immediately required. Any hire paid in advance shall be 
adjusted accordingly. [Emphasis added] 
 
Under this clause, there is a contractual right to set-off against hire charges paid in 
advance on the occurrence of the events stipulated.   
 
The position is common under the more recent standard forms. Clause 17 of the NYPE 
1993 contains a provision substantially similar to the 1946 version: the word ‘bunkers’ is 
used instead of ‘fuel’ and interestingly the cost of any bunkers and extra proven expenses 







 and SHELLTIME 4 off-hire 
clauses appear to be silent on the issue of set-off. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
There are a number of different types of charterparties, which have developed over time to 
serve different shipping needs. While it is difficult to categorise the nature of a time 
charterparty, the rights and obligations under these contracts are well defined and entrenched. 
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 BOXTIME is the Uniform Time Charter Party for Container Vessels issued by BIMCO.  
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 GENTIME is the General Time Charter Party issued by BIMCO. 
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The time charterer has the liability to pay hire, and failure to pay such hire will constitute a 
breach of contract. There must be a contractual right to set-off or this must be ordered by a 













CHAPTER IV CLASSIFYING THE CAUSES OF DELAY OR DEVIATION 
This chapter reviews the events which could potentially delay or deviate a voyage as 
contained in the traditional and standard forms, and attempts to categorise them into causes 
internal or external to the vessel. As discussed in the following chapters of this dissertation, 
this is relevant for determining whether the loss of time will take the vessel off-hire, and if so, 
whether the time charterer’s liability to pay hire will be suspended.  
 
I IMPLICATIONS OF DELAY 
The loss of time under traditional and standard charter forms may arise from a number of 
events. These include breach by the owner or the charterer and in some cases without the 
fault of either party.
72
 Other events which could give rise to delays include:
73
 failure to 
perform voyages with due dispatch; 
74
absence of a safe port to load or discharge cargo;
75
 off-
hire for any loss of time arising from a deficiency of the vessel;
76
 and deviation due to 
weather conditions,
77




Yvonne Baatz summarises the position thus:  
‘Standard forms of time charter provide that hire will cease to be payable on the 
occurrence of certain events which prevent the full working of the ship such as a 
breakdown of her engines, or the ship running aground, or detention by average 
accidents, or default and/or deficiency of men either for the time lost to the charterer as a 
result of such event or during the period that the event continues’.
79
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 Detention of a vessel by piracy is a classic example. 
73
 The NYPE Charterparty (Appendix G.10) is referenced as the example. John Hare 748.   
74
 Lord Hobhouse, in Whistler International Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The Hill Harmony) [2001] 1 AC 
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employment opportunities not missed and flexibility maintained”- see John Hare 749-50.  
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 ‘The vessel is to be loaded and discharged at any safe dock or safe berth or safe place at which she can ‘safely 
enter, lie and depart, always afloat at any time of tide [NYPE clause 12]’: John Hare 750. 
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 NYPE clause 17: John Hare 751. 
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 ‘… the charter period can be affected by unforeseen events such as bad weather conditions …’: Jan – Niklaas 
Brons The final leg of a time charter – developments after the Achilleas (unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
Cape Town, 2007) 15. 
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 The vessel will be considered off-hire from the commencement of such deviation: see William V Packard 
Fairplay Publications Limited, London, England, 1980 from 84–7. 
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II CLASSIFICATION OF DELAYS 
It may be convenient to categorise these main events
80
 into those ‘internal’ or ‘external’ 





(i) Deficiency of crew (insufficient numbers; strikes etc.)82 




(iii)Deficiency of vessel (breakdown of equipment or machinery, fire etc.)
84
 
(iv) Vessel deviates or puts back, contrary to the orders or direction of the charterers 
 
External 
(i) Arrest of vessel 
(ii) Absence of a safe port85 
(iii) Adverse weather conditions86 
(iv) Detention by average accidents to ship or cargo87 
 
                                                 
80
 This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of events which could result in the delay or deviation of a vessel, 
but rather represents the main risks identified in traditional and standard off-hire clauses.      
81
 The New York Produce Exchange (NYPE 93) Charterparty (Appendix G.10) is referenced as the example: 
John Hare 748.  
82
 Professor Hare asserts that ‘deficiency of men’ means ‘a numerical insufficiency of crew members, not mere 
refusal by some to do work’: John Hare 769. 
83
 The New York Produce Exchange (NYPE 93) Charterparty (Appendix G.10) is referenced as the example: 
John Hare 748.   
84
 NYPE 93 clause 17.  
85
 ‘The vessel is to be loaded and discharged at any safe dock or safe berth or safe place at which she can ‘safely 
enter, lie and depart, always afloat at any time of tide [NYPE clause 12]’: John Hare 750. It is a general 
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port’- see John Hare 762. This is known as the ‘safe port warranty’.  
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Fairplay Publications Limited, London, England, 1980 from 84 – 87. 
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 NYPE 93 clause 17; John Hare 751. Professor Hare interprets this to mean ‘an accident causing damage, and 
imposing some ‘physical constraint on the vessel’s movements in relation to her service under the charter’- see 












The consequence of the causes referred to occurring is usually the delay or deviation (in 
turn resulting in a delay) of the ship. Generally, under the traditional charters: 
 Where delays are caused by causes internal to the ship or her crew, the off-hire clause 
contained in the traditional charters is triggered and the time charterer is relieved from 
paying the hire charges for the period the ship is unavailable; and  
 Where delays are caused by causes external (extraneous) to the ship, the off-hire 
clause is generally not triggered, and the time charterer must continue to pay hire.  
 
While the position under the traditional charters is reasonably clear, it has become 
blurred in some respects as newer clauses have been developed to accommodate new events 
leading to off-hire. This is explained by Professor Rhidian Thomas as follows: 
‘Traditionally off-hire causes relate to the chartered vessel, her efficiency and ability to 
perform the services contracted for by the charterers. In other words, they are causes that 
may be regarded as internal to the ship. But in practice the ambit of the causes has over 
time extended into other categories. In tanker and in some of the modern dry cargo 
standard forms “deviation” is frequently identified as a generic off-hire cause, with 
“deviation” given a very wide definition. In general terms, the effect of this development 
is to extend off-hire causes to include causes relating to navigational misperformance by 
the vessel, but this extension continues to retain the traditional link with causes internal 
to the chartered vessel, albeit different in nature.’
88
   
 
By way of example, the BALTIME 1939 was amended in 2001 when outdated standard 
clauses were replaced with the latest revision published by BIMCO.
89
 These changes 
introduced ‘Detention by the arrest of the vessel’ and ‘Deviation or putting back (contrary to 
the orders of the charterers)’ as new causes of off-hire. However, as will be shown, piracy has 
maintained its status as being an event extraneous to the vessel.   
 
III CONCLUSION 
Where the cause of the delay or deviation is due to some internal cause i.e. default, defect or 
deficiency in the vessel or her crew, then generally under the traditional charters the risk lies 
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with the shipowner. This would include deficiency of men, breakdown, and other causes 
which prevent the full working of the vessel.   
 
Conversely, where the cause of the delay or deviation under the traditional charters is 
due to some external (extraneous) cause, the risk generally lies with the time charterer. This 
would include breach of the safe port warranty, adverse weather conditions and detention by 
average accident.  
 
This distinction has however become somewhat blurred with more recent clauses 
extending the ambit to widen causes such as ‘deviation’ to include ‘navigational 














CHAPTER V HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OFF-HIRE, WAR RISK 
AND PIRACY CLAUSES 
This chapter provides an historical overview of the development of off-hire, war risk and 
piracy clauses in time charter agreements to explain ‘why we are where we are’ and to 
contextualise the current options and range of contractual choices available to time charterers 
for risk mitigation purposes. 
 
I DEVELOPMENT OF CLAUSES 
It is trite that laws evolve as societies develop.
90
 In line with this reality, maritime and 




) to accommodate 
changing commercial realities and relationships. These new realities that parties have to deal 
with in the shipping industry are not always progressive, with piracy and terrorism being 
recent examples. A review of the development of the off-hire, war risk and piracy clauses 
shows that there appears to have been distinct periods during which changes have occurred to 
the standard agreements that to a large extent govern the shipping industry, as set out below.   
 
(a) 1930s and 1940s 
This is the period of the traditional charters (as defined in this dissertation), straddling World 
War II. Standard form charters such as the BALTIME 1939
93
 and NYPE 46 (1946) were 
developed during this period. The NYPE 46 in particular is still in widespread use today. The 
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 Professor Hare, in the preface to his book Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa (2ed) 
notes that ‘…maritime law, which is constantly evolving in a developing country such as South Africa, needs to 
look further than its immediate socio-legal roots’- see John Hare X. 
91
 Grant Hunter notes that ‘BALTIME 1939 has only undergone few changes since it was first published. In 
1974 a Part I box layout was introduced and in 2001 the document went through a minor technical revision 
where outdated standard clauses were replaced with the latest revision published by BIMCO. It is important to 
note that none of the revision has altered the substance and overall balance of the document.’: Grant Hunter 1.  
92
 Professor Michel notes that ‘War risk insurance cover had evolved in a convoluted way in that such risks were 
excluded from the hull cover by the FC&S (Free of Capture and Seizure) Clause which listed those risks which 
were excluded under the standard marine policy (the SG Form) attached as a Schedule to the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906.’: Keith Michel 199.   
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off-hire clauses in the standard form charters mentioned do not contain any provisions 




Piracy was not a significant risk during this period and this explains the absence of 
contractual provisions allocating the risk of piracy in the traditional charters. Explaining the 
lack of war risk clauses is more difficult. PanBras Logistics (an international participant in 
the shipping industry) elucidates this as follows: 
‘One of the serious shortcomings of the NYPE 1946 is that it contains no war clause in 
its printed text which, from time to time, has caused serious problems when parties 
having fixed on the basis of the NYPE 1946 form were confronted with a war or warlike 
situation. Even worse, in order to rectify this obvious shortcoming, there are many 
examples of parties having agreed to include as a rider clause to the NYPE 1946, the old 
Chamber of Shipping War Risks Clauses 1 & 2 which since long have been withdrawn as 
obsolete clauses and which were drafted way back in 1935 in connection with the 
Spanish Civil war for use with voyage charter parties only and, therefore, totally 




However war risk insurance was also readily available to parties,
96
 and where 
circumstances dictated, specific rider clauses could in any event be included by parties if 
piracy was seen as a possible threat.            
 
(b) 1950s to 1990s 
This can be called a period of consolidation in the shipping industry internationally. Being a 
‘conservative’ industry (in a commercial sense), parties were comfortable to continue to 
make use of standard forms to which they were accustomed, while only introducing bespoke 
changes where specific circumstances required. Minor revisions were introduced to the 
BALTIME 1939 in 1974. The NYPE was updated in 1981.  
                                                 
94
 Clause 11 of the BALTIME 1939 is the suspension of hire clause and clause 15 of the NYPE 46 is the off-hire 
clause. Neither includes piracy as suspension of hire or off-hire events.  
95
 PanBras Logistics ‘Explanatory note on Charter Party’, available at http://panbras.com.br/capacity/ 
Charter%20Party%20Terms1.pdf, accessed on 26 July 2013.  
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Grant Hunter records that: 
‘A number of attempts have been made to update the NYPE 46 form – notably in 1981 
when the Association of Ship Brokers and Agents (USA) Inc. (ASBA) prepared an 
updated version in consultation with industry bodies. The updated version, known as 
ASBATIME, only gained limited acceptance in the market. The 1946 version continued 
to dominate the dry cargo time charter sector although increasingly the form was 
accompanied by an ever-growing number of often badly written “home-made” rider 
clauses.’
97
   
 
Shell also produced its SHELLTIME 4
98
 form for wet cargo (tankers) during this period 
(December 1984).  
 
(c) 1990s to mid-2000s 
With the increasing threat of piracy, shipping bodies began (albeit slowly) to include piracy 
conditions in their standard charterparty forms, although usually as part of war risk clauses.
99
 
While these clauses deal with piracy in relation to additional insurance, deviation and 
additional expenses (all arising from the charterer’s orders to trade the vessel through an area 
of risk), they do not provide for the vessel to go off-hire or for the charterer to be relieved of 
his obligation to pay hire in the event of delay or deviation due to piracy.  
 
Thus, for example, clause 31 (e) of NYPE 1993 provides as follows: 
 
‘31 (e) War Clauses 
(i) No contraband of war shall be shipped. The Vessel shall not be required, without the 
consent of the Owners, which shall not be unreasonably witheld, to enter any port or 
zone which is involved in a state of war, warlike operations, or hostilities, civil strife, 
insurrection or piracy whether there be a declaration of war or not, where the Vessel, 
cargo or crew might reasonably be expected to be subject to capture, seizure or arrest, or 
to a hostile act by a belligerent power (the term “power” meaning any de jure or de facto 
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authority or any purported governmental organization maintaining naval, military or air 
forces). [Emphasis added] 
 
(ii) If such consent is given by the Owners, the Charterers will pay the provable 
additional cost of insuring the Vessel against hull war risks in an amount equal to the 
value under her ordinary hull policy but not exceeding a valuation of [ Blank ]. In 
addition, the Owners may purchase and the Charterers will pay for war risk insurance on 
ancilliary risks such as loss of hire, freight disbursements, total loss, blocking and 
trapping, etc. If such insurance is not obtainable commercially or through a government 
program, the Vessel shall not be required to enter or remain at any such port or zone. 
 
(iii) In the event of the existence of the conditions described in (i) subsequent to the date 
of this Charter, or while the Vessel is on hire under this Charter, the Charterers shall, in 
respect of voyages to any such port or zone assume the provable additional cost of wages 
and insurance properly incurred in connection with master, officers and crew as a 
consequence of such war, warlike operations or hostilities. 
 
(iv) Any war bonus to officers and crew due to the Vessel’s trading or cargo carried shall 
be for the Charterer’s account.’         
 
Therefore under this clause the vessel cannot be directed by the charterer to enter any 
piracy zone (where there is the reasonable prospect of hijack) unless with the consent of the 
owner. In such a case (i.e. where the owner provides consent) charterer will be liable for the 
additional cost of insurance, including at the owner’s election the additional cost of insurance 
for loss of hire. Where no insurance cover is available the vessel cannot be required to enter 
the zone of risk. This zone is very extensive and has been declared by the Lloyd’s of London 




Similarly, the BIMCO Standard War Risks Clause for Time Charters, 1993 (Code 
Name: “CONWARTIME 1993”)
101
 includes “acts of piracy” in the definition of “War Risks” 
as follows: 
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 CONWARTIME is a clause issued by BIMCO that can be used as a rider clause or simply replace another 













(1) For the purposes of this clause, the words: 
(a) … 
(b) "War Risks" shall include any war (whether actual or threatened), act of war, civil war, 
hostilities, revolution, rebellion, civil commotion, warlike operations, the laying of 
mines (whether actual or reported), acts of piracy, acts of terrorists, acts of hostility or 
malicious damage, blockades (whether imposed against all vessels or imposed 
selectively against vessels of certain flags or ownership, or against certain cargoes or 
crews or otherwise howsoever'), by any person, body, terrorist or political group, or the 
Government of any state whatsoever, which, in the reasonable judgement of the Master 
and/or the Owners, may be dangerous or are likely to be or to become dangerous to the 
Vessel, her cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel.’ [Emphasis added] 
(2) The Vessel, unless the written consent of the Owners be first obtained, shall not be ordered 
to or required to continue to or through, any port, place, area or zone ( hether of land or sea), or 
any waterway or canal, where it appears that the Vessel, her cargo, crew or other persons on 
board the Vessel, in the reasonable judgement of the Master and/or the Owners, may be, or are 




(4) (a) … 
 (b) If the Underwriters of such insurance should require payment of premiums and/or calls 
because, pursuant to the Charterers' orders, the Vessel is within, or is due to enter and 
remain within, any area or areas which are specified by such Underwriters as being subject 
to additional premiums because of War Risks, then such premiums and/or calls shall be 
reimbursed by the Charterers to the Owners at the same time as the next payment of hire is 
due’.  
 
As can be seen, while the BIMCO clause is quite similar to the NYPE 1993 clause, it 
extends the causes (beyond those contained in the NYPE 93) to include ‘acts of terrorists’ 
and the protagonists to include any ‘political group’ or ‘the Government of any state 
whatsoever’. Under this clause, the master (in addition to the owner as in the NYPE 1993) 
may also exercise reasonable judgement to declare a zone unsafe.       
 












‘If in compliance with any of the provisions of sub-clauses (2) to (7) of this Clause 
anything is done or not done, such shall not be deemed a deviation, but shall be 
considered as due fulfilment of this Charterparty.”  
 
Accordingly, under the terms of this charter form (CONWARTIME 1993), the delay or 
deviation of the vessel due to an act or potential threat of piracy will not take the vessel off-
hire, and the charterer is liable to continue paying hire during that period.   
 
In other cases of the period, there is no allocation of piracy risk at all (e.g. 
SHELLTIME 4).
102
 The SHELLTIME 4 war risks clause reads as follows:  
‘35. War Risks 
The master shall not be required or bound to sign Bills of Lading for any place which in 
his or Owners' reasonable opinion is dangerous or impossible for the vessel to enter or 
reach owing to any blockade, war, hostilities, warlike operations, civil war, civil 
commotions or revolutions.’  
 
(d) Post 2009 
Following pressure from the industry to more equitably distribute the risk of delay or 
deviation caused by pirate attacks between the vessel owner and the time charterer, 
consequent on increasing incidents of piracy (especially off the coast of east Africa), various 
shipping bodies then developed and issued separate piracy clauses, which were intended to be 
added to, or incorporated in, standard charterparty agreements. BIMCO issued its first 
separate piracy clause in March 2009 (which became seen as too shipowner-friendly), and 
subsequently updated it in November 2009 to make the clause more charterer-friendly by 
shifting some of the risk away from the charterer. It did this by providing that the vessel 
would remain on-hire but hire payments would cease 90 days after seizure (and resume once 
the vessel is released). Similarly the GOA
103
 piracy clause provided for payment of hire to be 
suspended after a period of 60 days in the event of detention by pirates. INTERTANKO
104
 
followed suit with standard piracy clauses for both time and voyage charters, but which did 
not provide for the vessel to go off-hire, and remained shipowner-friendly.    
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Bespoke clauses have also now gained in popularity, in circumstances where charterers 
may find themselves in the favourable negotiating position to include individualised clauses 
in their charters.
105
 But this is ‘swings and roundabouts’ as the balance of commercial trade 
ebbs and flows
106
 between owners and charterers; charterers would be well advised to make 
use of standard forms or clauses which balance their interests rather than rely on some 
perceived ad hoc negotiating advantage.  
 
II CONCLUSION 
This development of the clauses, and how the shipping industry responds to change, is neatly 
summed up by Grant Hunter as follows: 
‘Perhaps the greatest challenge that BIMCO faces in terms of the uptake of its modern 
forms is the challenge of outdated documents. An imprecisely worded and outdated 
document that has nevertheless been tried and tested by the courts and through arbitration 
proceedings is often more appealing to users than a comprehensive modern form. This is 
often simply an issue of familiarity. In many cases, users will adopt some of the thinking 
behind a new or revised document and incorporate the ideas into older forms as rider 
clauses. However, the risks of introducing incompatible, and possibly conflicting, rider 
clauses are obvious. It remains one of BIMCO’s most enduring challenges to encourage 
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The development of the clauses reallocating some of the risk of piracy may not have 
taken place as quickly or have been as all-encompassing as may have been expected. The 
more recent clauses (particularly the bespoke piracy clauses) have gone some way to improve 
the risk position of the charterers as will be more fully explained in the following chapters of 














CHAPTER VI THE OFF-HIRE CLAUSES IN TIME CHARTERPARTIES 
This chapter gives a general overview of the off-hire clauses in time charters, explaining their 
purpose and operation, and then discusses off-hire more specifically under the traditional 
charters.    
 
I   BACKGROUND TO OFF-HIRE CLAUSES 
Off-hire clauses are relevant for determining who bears the loss resulting from delay or 
deviation of the vessel under a time charter arrangement. Once the off-hire event occurs and 
time is lost, the result is that the risk shifts to the owner who will then bear the financial brunt 
of delay if the charterer discharges the onus of proving that the event does indeed fall within 
the ambit of the off-hire clause. 
 
The purpose of the off-hire clause is to protect the charterer by giving him an escape 
route from his payment obligations. This represents an exception to the general rule that the 
charterer is liable to pay hire continuously. The charterer therefore bears the onus of showing 
that the vessel goes off-hire. As John Weale states:  ‘The off-hire clause being in the nature of 
an exception is to be construed narrowly against the charterer because it is included for his 
sole benefit’.
108
 In order for a charterer to benefit from the provisions of the off-hire clause, it 
must be shown by the charterer that the event clearly falls within the language of the specific 
off-hire provision.  
 
This was confirmed by Phillimore J in The Ilissos:
109
 
‘The cardinal rule, if I may recall is such, in interpreting such a charter-party as this, is 
that the charterer will pay hire for the ship unless he can bring himself within the 
exceptions. I think he must bring himself clearly within the exceptions. If there is a doubt 
as to what the words mean, then I think those words must be read in favour of the owners 
because the charterer is attempting to cut down the owner’s right to hire.’   
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This will entail an analysis of the language used in the off-hire clause and whether the 
event relied on by the charterer falls within the specific exemption in the clause.  
 
‘Off-hire clauses may vary in their nature, conditions and terms. They may be generic 
or special, and time lost may be measured by reference to the period of the off-hire event or 
on a net loss of time basis’.
110
 Each off-hire clause has its own wording but off-hire causes 
mainly relate to ‘the chartered vessel, her efficiency and ability to perform the service 




As Lars Gorton explains:  
‘There are circumstances however which are defined in the off-hire or (suspension of 




II REALIGNMENT OF THE RISK 
‘Off-hire clauses essentially realign the way risk is distributed in time charterparties’,
113
 
shifting the burden of a vessel going off-hire to the charterer. Professor Rhidian Thomas 
explains the position as follows:  
‘There is clear justification for this redistribution of risk when the loss of time results 
from an event within the area of responsibility and which adversely affects the full or 
efficient working of the vessel. This cause and effect appears to represent the philosophy 




This philosophy was set out by Kerr J in The Mariva AS:
115
 
‘I think that the object is clear. The owners provide the ship and crew to work her. So 
long as they are fully efficient and able to render to the charterers the services then 
required, hire is payable continuously. But if the ship is for any reason not in full 
working order to render the services then required of her, and the charterers suffer loss of 
time in consequence, then hire is not payable from the time so lost.’  
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The charterer bears the onus of proving that the off-hire clause has been triggered and 
falls within a certain named clause in the specific time charter policy. Kerr J, in The Mareva 
AS,
116
 reinforces this point: 
‘It is settled law that prima facie hire is payable continuously and that it is for the charterers to 
bring themselves clearly within an off-hire clause if they contend that hire ceases.’ 
 
If the off-hire clause is triggered the payment of hire is suspended. However, the 
existence and operation of the charterparty is not affected unless the contract specifically 
states otherwise. 
 
III REQUIREMENT OF LOSS OF TIME 
The charterer must not only prove that an off-hire cause has been established but also ‘that 
there has been a loss of time as a result of a fortuitous off-hire clause’.
117
 The first enquiry in 
an off-hire situation is to determine if the full working of the vessel has been prevented. The 
charterers have the obligation to show this.
118
 As held in the case of The Aquacharm,
119
 Lord 
Denning MR said: 
‘We are to enquire first whether "the full working of the vessel” has been prevented. 
Only if it has do we consider the “cause”.’ 
 
Provided also that there is a loss of time to the charter as well as the cause which the 
charterer relies upon falls within one of the named clauses hire will be interrupted. 
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IV OFF-HIRE IN THE TRADITIONAL CHARTERS 
Time charters are distinctive from other charter arrangements because essentially time rounds 
against the charterer. Any loss of time beyond the fixed time period is usually for the 
charterer’s account unless the off-hire clause is triggered. As John Hare explains:  
‘The time charterer contracts with the owner (or the demise charterer as “disponent 
owner”) for the exclusive use of the cargo carrying spaces on board a ship for a fixed 
time period. This period may be related to a contemplated voyage, for a round trip, or 




The consequence is, as Lord Hobhouse of the English Court of Appeal in The Hill 
Harmony observed: ‘The owner of a time chartered vessel does not normally have any 
interest in saving time’.
121





The off-hire clauses in the traditional charters were developed by various shipping 
bodies and generally follow a consistent approach. They are substantially similar, and provide 
for the vessel to go off-hire under a number of different events. The common approach is that 
under the traditional charters only causes which are inherent to the ‘internal workings’ of the 
ship or crew generally take the vessel off-hire, thereby relieving the charterer of the liability 
to pay hire.  
 
The NYPE 46 is the most widely used traditional charter. Clause 15 of NYPE 46 is the 
off-hire clause in this standard agreement. The full clause is set out below:  
‘15. Off Hire 
That in the event of the loss of time from deficiency of men or stores, fire, breakdown or 
damages to hull, machinery or equipment, grounding, detention by average accidents to 
ship or cargo, drydocking for the purpose of examination or painting bottom, or by any 
other cause preventing the full working of the vessel, the payment of hire shall cease 
from the time thereby lost; and if upon the voyage the speed be reduced by defect in or 
any breakdown of any part of her hull, machinery or equipment, the time so lost, and the 
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cost of any extra fuel consumed in consequence thereof, and all extra expenses shall be 
deducted from the hire.’  
 
The clause provides for loss of time caused by the events mentioned.  Piracy is not 
included as an off-hire event. 
 
As will be seen, many of the more recent off-hire clauses in other standard forms 
adopted a similar approach, often borrowing the language/terminology of the NYPE 46 
causes.  
 
The other main off-hire clause in the traditional charters is contained in the BALTIME 
1939. The off-hire clause (called the ‘Suspension of Hire’ clause in this standard form) in this 
standard form reads as follows: 
“11. Suspension of Hire etc.  
(A) In the event of drydocking or other necessary measures to maintain the efficiency 
of the Vessel, deficiency of men or Owner’s stores, breakdown of machinery, 
damage to hull or other accident, either hindering or preventing the full working of 
the Vessel and continuing for more than twenty-four hour consecutive hours, no 
hire shall be paid in respect of any time lost thereby during the period in which the 
Vessel is unable to perform the service immediately required. Any hire paid in 
advance shall be adjusted accordingly.  
(B) In the event of the Vessel being driven into port or to anchorage through stress of 
weather, trading to shallow harbours or to rivers or ports with bars or suffering an 
accident to her cargo, and detention of the Vessel and/or expenses resulting from 
such detention shall be for the Charterer’s account even if such detention and 
or/expenses, or the cause by reason of which either is incurred, be due to, or be 
contributed to by the negligence of the Owner’s servants.” 
 
There are some minor differences between the off-hire clauses in the NYPE 46 and the 
BALTIME 1939, but they ‘are usually read in the same way’.
123
 Under the BALTIME 1939 
clause, off-hire only starts to run 24 hours after the occurrence of the initial event triggering 
the delay, whereas under the NYPE 46 off-hire commences immediately. Both clauses 
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include ‘deficiency of men or stores’
124
as events leading to off-hire, and contain similar 
provisions dealing with  ‘breakdown’
125
, ‘detention by average accidents to ship or cargo’
126
 
and ‘any other cause preventing the full working of the vessel’
127
 In neither case are ‘war’ or 
‘piracy’ causes included as an event in the off-hire clause.   
 
V CONCLUSION 
Off-hire clauses are intended to benefit the time charterer by sending the vessel off-hire and 
absolving the charterer from his payment obligations. Because this is an exception to the 
general rule that the time charterer must pay hire continuously, and is for the benefit of the 
charterer, the charterer to succeed must bring the event into the causes contained in the off-
hire clauses. As has been shown, these off-hire clauses do realign risk if the cause can be 
brought within the confines of the specific wording used.     
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CHAPTER VII IMPLICATIONS OF PIRACY FOR OFF-HIRE CLAUSES IN 
TRADITIONAL CHARTERS  
This chapter considers how the risk of delay or deviation resulting from a pirate attack or the 
threat of a pirate attack would be allocated as between the shipowner and time charterer 
under off-hire clauses in traditional charters. As can be expected, law reports often record 
disputes involving off-hire, where charterers have attempted to persuade the courts that the 
vessel has gone off-hire, while shipowners – not surprisingly – contend the opposite. 
Although many of these cases are fairly recent, the courts are called upon to rule on disputes 
arising from the interpretation of clauses under traditional charters (such as NYPE 46), 
demonstrating again that these traditional charters remain in widespread use.  
 
I PIRACY CASE LAW ON OFF-HIRE CLAUSES
128
 
Under the traditional charters surveyed previously, piracy is not specifically included as a 
cause leading to the loss of time. The issue then is whether the courts, in interpreting the off-
hire clauses in traditional charters, and considering the context of the event, have left the risk 
of detention due to piracy with the time charterer (as is usually the case with external events) 
or shifted/partly shifted it to the shipowner.  
 
There have been a number of leading cases where the courts have been called on to decide 
whether a vessel has gone off-hire as a consequence of piracy under off-hire clauses in 
traditional charters. In reaching their decisions, the courts have had the job of interpreting the 
wording of the causes contained in the specific off-hire clauses. Baris Soyer explains this 
need for construction as follows: 
‘It may be possible that parties fail to make their intentions clear by adopting a word 
which has more than one ordinary or conventional meaning (linguistic ambiguity). 
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Similarly, the linguistic vagueness of the words employed may make it impossible to 
state the parties’ intentions in an unequivocal fashion. It may also be possible that 
interpretative problems in a contract arise simply because the future is unpredictable and 
parties fail to provide a contingency for every type of eventuality which may arise under 
the contract’.
129
   
 
In the cases discussed in the following section the time charterparties continued to use 
one of the traditional charter forms (the NYPE 46) with minor amendments. Following on 
Baris Soyer’s useful construct, the parties here knew the risks of piracy yet chose to remain 
with the old NYPE form (although with some modifications), thereby failing to provide for 
this contingency and therefore had to persuade the courts that the words used supported their 
interpretation.      
           
NYPE CASE LAW 
In Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Team Up Owning Co Ltd (The MV Saldanha),
130
 the MV 
Saldanha was chartered in terms of a time charterparty which was concluded on the NYPE 
46 form. The vessel was seized by pirates whilst transiting the Gulf of Aden, and held for a 
period of almost three months. The shipowner claimed loss of hire from the charterers for the 
days the ship had been held to ransom. The charterers’ counterclaimed for damages alleging 
that the vessel had been unseaworthy as ‘the master and crew had not been properly prepared 
to deal with an attack by pirates’.
131
 In the arbitration the tribunal was called upon to 
determine whether the act of piracy fell within the ambit of Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 (the 
off-hire clause).  
 
Here the loss of time arising from the detention by pirates was not in dispute; the 
tribunal held that the “full working” of the vessel had been prevented by the actions of the 
pirates. The charterers had refused to pay for the time that the vessel was not able to work. 
The owners claimed the hire, plus the cost of bunkers, plus the additional war risk premium 
(the charter form contained a war risk clause) and crew war risk bonuses.  
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It was decided by the tribunal that piracy could not be classified as an off-hire event. 
The charterers however took this decision of the arbitration on appeal to the Commercial 
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division where the charterers attempted to bring themselves 
within the wording of the exemption clauses.  
 
Gross J dealt with the applicable principles as follows: 
‘Pausing here, it is worth underlining that the applicable principles are beyond argument. 
As is hornbook law and was clearly expressed in the award, under a time charterparty, 
hire is payable continuously unless charterers can bring themselves within any 
exceptions, the onus being on charterers to do so. Doubt as to the meaning of exceptions 
is to be resolved in favour of owners. Unless within the ambit of the exceptions, the risk 
of delay is borne by charterers. The justice of the matter is to be found in the bargain 
struck by the parties. Mr. Barker QC, for Owners, put it well in his skeleton argument: 
“There is no relevant concept of fairness other than the contractual balance 
struck by the off-hire clause, construed in accordance with well-known 
orthodoxy”.’
132
   
 
The case before the court on appeal was narrowed to three issues i.e. whether the 
charterers could bring themselves within one or more of the following causes contained in 
clause 15 of the charterparty (NYPE 46), namely (1) ‘Detention by average accidents to ship 
or cargo’; (2) ‘Default and/or deficiency of men’; and (3) ‘any other cause’. These are dealt 
with in turn below.      
   
‘Detention by average accident’ 
The charterers advanced the following argument – ‘… the reference to an ‘average 
accident’ is not intended to require that there be damage to the Vessel i.e., physical loss, nor 
to require that there be an ‘accident’ as that term would be understood in an everyday sense, 
but to enumerate that the Vessel will be off-hire in the event of ‘detention’ … due to 
fortuities which are marine perils. Piracy is a marine peril…’.
133
  Gross J gave this argument 
short-shrift. First he held that this (the pirate attack) could not be described as an accident and 
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upheld the view of the tribunal that ‘an accident requires a lack of intent… an obviously 
deliberate and violent attack is not described as an accident, no matter how unexpected it may 
have been to the victim’.
134
 And secondly that if detention through an act of piracy was to be 
regarded as an accident this would run contrary to the case of Mareva Navigation Co v 
Canaria Armadora SA (The Mareva AS)
135
 where as a firmly established rule it was held that 
for an ‘average accident’ to have occurred damage was a necessary consequence. In this case 
(The Mareva AS) Kerr J held that the phrase ‘average accident’ referred merely to an accident 
which caused physical damage (to ship or cargo). 
 
Further dealing with the terminology “average accident” Gross J, after discussing its 
insurance context, concludes that ‘… in this context, damage to the ship is an essential 




‘Default and/or deficiency of men’ 
At the arbitration the charterers had also contended that the owners (represented by the 
officers and crew) had failed to take the usual (reasonable) steps to prevent the vessel 
from being hijacked by pirates and that this failure fell within the exception “default of 
men”. On appeal, counsel for the owners argued that the ‘natural meaning of “default of 
men” included a failure to perform or a breach by the Master and crew of their 
duties’.
137
 Gross J agreed with the tribunal that the words “default of men” had a 
limited meaning, namely “ … of a refusal by Officers or crew to perform all or part of 
their duties as owed to the shipowner and not the negligent or inadvertent performance 
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  Gross J then proceeded to make four additional comments in 
support of his views, namely:
139
 
(1) It must be accepted that the natural meaning of “default” ‘is capable of including 
the negligent or inadvertent performance of the Master and crew’; 
(2) The history (context) of the clause must be considered. Gross J referred to the 
Royal Greek Government case
140
 where the court held that the words “deficiency 
of men” meant “numerical insufficiency”. In this case (i.e. The Saldanha) ‘the 
vessel had a full complement of crew, so the wording did not assist the charterers’. 
Gross J also went on to hold that “deficiency of men” ‘did not extend to cover a 
wilful refusal to work’; 
(3) The addition of the words (in the off-hire clause) ‘… including strike of Officers 
and/or crew’ did not help the charterer’s case as this ‘is a pointer towards a narrow 
construction of “default of men”, consistent with the history of the clause and the 
mischief at which it is aimed’.  
(4) The allocation of the risk of delay under a typical time charterparty lies with the 
charterer. If this were not the case Gross J concludes, then ‘on almost every 
occasion when Officers or crew negligently or inadvertently fail to perform their 
duties causing some loss of time, then a vessel would be off-hire under this 
wording’.  
 
Gross J therefore held that the charterers had failed ‘to satisfy the burden of bringing 
themselves clearly within the wording of cl. 15 in question’. The charterer’s therefore failed 
in their bid to persuade the appeal court that the action of the officers and crew, in failing to 
take the necessary precautions to avoid a pirate attack, constituted ‘default and/or deficiency 
of men’ within the wording of the off-hire clause.      
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‘Any other cause’ 
As the above causes failed to come to the aid of the charterers and bring them within 
the wording of clause 15, the last string to their bow was to try to rely on the seemingly 
broad words of the exception ‘any other cause’. The appeal court could not fail to 
notice that the wording was ‘any other cause’ and not ‘any other cause whatsoever’ 
[Emphasis added]. Gross J, in remarking that the difference was significant, referred to 
the judgement of Rix J in The Laconian Confidence (see next case), where it was held 
that those words (i.e. ‘any other cause’) ‘should be construed either ejusdem generis or 
at any rate in some limited way reflecting the general context of the charter and clause 
… A consideration of the named causes indicates that they all relate to the physical 





A summary of the charterer’s case in the appeal court taken from the judgement is as 
follows [Paraphrased]: the wording “any other cause” (without the additional word 
“whatsoever”) was a sweeping up provision; the wording was there to prevent “disputes 
founded on nice distinctions”; that it was not easy to identify any “genus” which included all 
of the named causes in clause 15; if technically “average accident” did require there to be 
damage, nevertheless a fortuitous occurrence normally covered by marine insurance but 
which happened not to have caused damage, would be within the ‘spirit” of the clause and 
caught by the wording “any other cause”; even if “default of men” did not cover negligent 
errors, given the sweeping up wording, such a “fine distinction” should not determine 
whether or not the vessel was off-hire; that there had been a “refusal to perform” their duties 
on the part of Officers and crew and no less so because the Officers and crew were under 
duress from pirates; and lastly it was necessary to consider the effect of piracy as much as 
piracy itself.
142
    
 
Counsel for the charterer concluded his argument by summarising his client’s case as 
follows: 
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‘Seizure by pirates is far from being a totally extraneous cause. It operates by disabling the 
officers and crew, who are just as much unable to work as if struck down with typhus, and by 
immobilising the ship, just as much as if it were aground or if there were not enough crew to 
work it. Owners are entitled to hire if they provide a functioning ship and a crew able to work 
the ship to provide the service required – neither ship nor crew can function if seized by pirates 




Gross J was wholly unpersuaded by this line of argument, remarking that ‘I think that 
seizure by pirates is a “classic example” of a totally extraneous cause.’
144
  The appeal court 
therefore held that ‘any other cause’ should be construed restrictively. Gross J accepted the 
decision in The Laconian Confidence that the ejusdem generis rule
145
 should be used to 
confine the words ‘any other cause’ to causes relating narrowly to those ‘all related to the 
physical condition or efficiency of the vessel’.
146
 It was also suggested that if the clause had 
read ‘any other cause whatsoever’ this might have resulted in an entirely different outcome. 
Since off-hire did not cover the situation where the crew failed to carry out their duties while 
under the control of the pirates, or that ‘no delay had arisen out of the condition or efficiency 





An interesting aspect of this case (The Saldanha) is that the charterparty also contained 
a bespoke ‘Seizure and Arrest’ clause. However the court held that this clause also did not 
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come to the assistance of the charterer as, based on its precise wording, the language did not 
extend to cover detention by pirates. 
 
In the case of Andre & Cie SA v Orient Shipping Notterdam (The Laconian 
Confidence)
148
  the owners had let the vessel The Laconian Confidence to the charterers on 
the NYPE 46 form. They used the standard off-hire clause. The vessel was delayed by 18 
days in a Bangladeshi port because the authorities refused to let her leave due to ‘residue 
sweepings’ (old rice which had been left behind in the hold). The charterer’s case was that 
the vessel was off-hire (in terms of the NYPE 46 clause) while it was in port under detention 
by the authorities. 
 
It was held that the expression “any other cause” must be construed ejusdem generis 
with the preceding lists of incidents namely; (i) incidents concerning the manning provisions 




In this case, Rix J stated as follows: 
‘The unamended words “any other cause” do not cover an entirely extraneous cause … if 
the clause had been amended to contain the word ‘whatsoever’, then the position would 
probably have been otherwise.’  
 
Although each case is dealt with on its particular facts and the exact wording of the 
clause in dispute, it seems as if the English courts may find that the inclusion of the words 
‘any other cause whatsoever’ may well bring the charterers within the wording of Clause 15 
of NYPE 46.   
 
Another recent case of Osmium Shipping Corporation v Cargill International SA (‘The 
Captain Stefanos’)
150
dealt with the off-hire clause under the NYPE 46 form. Here the parties 
entered into a charterparty on an amended NYPE 46 form. The vessel was to carry coal from 
Richards Bay (South Africa) to Europe. The intended route was up the east coast of Africa, 
past Somalia and then on to the Suez Canal to Europe. The vessel was unfortunately hijacked 
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by pirates off the coast of Somalia and detained for a period of about 2½ months. The 
charterers contended that the vessel was off-hire during this period.   
 
The terms of the clause however differed somewhat from those in the case of  The 
Saldanha as here a capture/seizure clause (see below) was made an additional contractual 
term of the contract enetered into between the parties. The charterer chose not to contest, in 
view of the ruling in The Saldanha, that the vessel was off-hire pursuant to the standard 
clause 15 of the NYPE form.
151
 This case shows that different provisions i.e. those provisions 
which depart from the standard form traditional time charter arrangements may lead to a 
different outcome. Ultimately the risk in this case was on the owner rather than the charterer 
who in normal circumstances bears the risk of the vessel going off-hire.  
 
An ad hoc clause (Clause 56) provided as follows:  
‘Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage by reason of any accident or breakdown, or 
in the event of loss of time either in port or at sea or deviation upon the course of the 
voyage caused by sickness of or accident to the crew or any person on board the vessel 
(other than supercargo travelling by request of the Charterers) or by reason of the refusal 
of the master or crew to perform their duties, or oil pollution even if alleged, or 
capture/seizure, or detention or threat of detention by any authority including arrest, the 
hire shall be suspended from the time of the inefficiency until the vessel is again efficient 
in the same or equidistant position in Charterers’ option, and voyage resumed therefrom. 
All extra directly related expenses incurred including bunkers consumed during period of 
suspended hire shall be for Owners’ account.’[Emphasis added] 
 
The court in deciding that the hire was to cease to be payable relied on a number of 
factors. In addition the charterparty also contained the CONWARTIME 2004 clause upon 
which the owners sought to rely. Honourable Justice Cooke held however that: 
‘The CONWARTIME Clause, upon which owners rely, cannot bear the weight which 
the Owners wish to give it. It is a clause relating to the performance of the Charterparty 
and to breach, and not to off-hire. The CONWARTIME Clause does not deal with hire 




                                                 
151
 Andre & Cie SA v Orient Shipping Notterdam (The Laconian Confidence) (1997) CLC 314–15. 
152












The court ‘determined that the hijack of a vessel by pirates was an off-hire event 
pursuant to an additional clause that provided for the vessel to be off-hire for capture/seizure, 
despite the incorporation of the CONWARTIME 2004 clause.’
153
 The court found that, in the 
absence of the specially introduced ad hoc clause (ie the capture/seizure clause), the vessel 
would have remained on-hire (following its detention by pirates off Somalia) under clause 15 
of the NYPE 46 form in light of the decision in The Saldanha. 
 
It will be useful to review whether the cases referred to above treated the events 
(causes) which led to the loss of time and resultant off-hire in their particular set of 
circumstances in the same way: 
 
‘Detention by average accident’ – The Saldanha is authority for the proposition that an 
intentional attack (such as an act of piracy) is not an ‘accident’ and that for an ‘average 
accident’ to occur damage to the vessel or cargo was necessary. The interpretation of these 
words did not arise in the other cases discussed.  
 
‘Default and/or deficiency of men’ – The Saldanha is authority for the proposition that 
that the words have a limited meaning, and do not extend to cover the ‘negligent or 
inadvertent performance of their duties’. Similarly the interpretation of these words did not 
arise in the other cases discussed.  
 
‘Any other cause’ – The Saldanha is authority for the proposition that ‘any other cause’ 
meant something different to ‘any other cause whatsoever’;
154
 and that the words (’any other 
cause’) should be construed ejusdem generis and therefore relate to the physical condition or 
efficiency of the vessel. Therefore seizure by pirates is an extraneous cause and does not fall 
within the parameters of the wording of the off-hire clauses (in the traditional charters). In 
The Laconian Confidence (which was decided before The Saldanha) the court held that the 
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addition of the word ‘whatsoever’ in the circumstances of the case (unlawful detention by 
port authorities) would ‘probably’ bring it within the off-hire clause in NYPE 46 even though 
this was an extraneous event.  Neither of the parties in The Laconian Confidence took the 
view that the vessel was off-hire under the standard clause, a position supported by the court, 
demonstrating the persuasive authority of The Saldanha judgement. 
 
‘Seizure and arrest’ – In The Saldanha the court found that the specific terms of a 
bespoke ‘seizure and arrest’ clause did not assist the charterer because it did not extend to 
cover detention by pirates. On the other hand, in The Captain Stefanos, the court found that 
the specific wording of the ‘capture/seizure’ clause introduced into the chartyparty in that 
case did cause the vessel to go off-hire following a pirate attack, and therefore worked in 
favour of the charterer.   
    
II CONCLUSION 
As illustrated in the case of The Saldanha those causes which are extraneous to the vessel do 
not usually trigger off-hire in traditional charters. Generally ‘the financial risk of delay of the 
vessel due to bad weather, strikes of pilots or stevedores, detention by piracy etc., during the 
charter period normally rests on the charterer’.
155
 Similarly the courts have held that delays 
due to war conditions do not take the vessel off-hire under the traditional charters.156 John 
Weale, in discussing third party intervention, remarks that:  
‘Typically, such an event is the one which falls awkwardly in the no-man’s land between 
the Charterer’s field of responsibility and the risks which must lie with the Owner, a loss 
of time arising from the intervention of some independent third party. On which side of 




The courts seemed to have answered this rather conclusively, finding consistently that, 
under the traditional charters, the vessel does not go off-hire following detention by a piracy 
event.   
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Finally, Gross J offers some good advice to charterparties: 
‘Should parties be minded to treat seizures by pirates as an off-hire event under a time 
charterparty, they can do so straightforwardly and most obviously by way of an express 
provision in a “seizures” or “detention” clause. Alternatively and at the very least, they 
can add the word “whatsoever” to the wording “any other cause”, although this route will 
not give quite the same certainty as it presently hinges on obiter dicta, albeit of a most 
persuasive kind.’
158
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CHAPTER VIII IMPACT OF RECENT OFF-HIRE, WAR RISK AND PIRACY 
CLAUSES 
This chapter examines whether the introduction of recent off-hire, war risk and ‘model’ 
piracy clauses (the last of which seek to address piracy specifically) have served to allocate 
the risk of delays or deviation more equitably as between the shipowner and time charterer 
and in so doing to provide the time charterer with a greater measure of protection against 
losses occasioned by delays or deviation due to piracy.  
 
I SELECTED RECENT OFF-HIRE, WAR RISK AND PIRACY CLAUSES IN 
TIME CHARTERS 
It has long been recognised (by the courts and practitioners) that under off-hire clauses in 
traditional charters the risk of piracy is carried by the charterer. It will be worthwhile 
establishing how industry associations responded to the increasing risk of piracy by adapting 
or revising contractual terms in charterparty hire. One response could have been to adapt the 
standard off-hire clauses to cater for piracy as an event triggering off-hire. As will be shown, 
this is not what happened. Charterers (where having the commercial power to negotiate) 
began to make use of the wording ‘any other cause whatsoever’ [Emphasis added] in the off-
hire clauses in the traditional charters in the belief that this would bring piracy into the 
wording of the off-hire clauses. Standard off-hire clauses were not substantially changed, and 
the industry associations rather began to include piracy as an event (cause) in war risk 
clauses, and later in separate ‘piracy clauses’. As will be shown from the analyisis which 
follows, these clauses still allocate risks differently and only a few shift some of the risk of 
piracy away from the charterer.  
 
For convenience, the clauses are grouped under the following categories, namely: (1) 
















(a) NYPE 93 
Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 is the NYPE off-hire clause and is substantially similiar to the 
1946 off- hire clause (clause 15). Piracy is not specifically provided for in this clause. (The 
inclusion of piracy as a war risk was included as a different clause – see below under the War 
Risk Clauses). 
 
(b) BALTIME 2001159 
The 1939 BALTIME was revised in 2001, clause 11 of which is the off-hire clause (called 
the ‘Suspension of Hire’ clause in the standard form). Using language similar to the NYPE 
93, where the full working of the vessel is hindering or prevented, and this endures for more 
than twenty-four consecutive hours, no hire shall be paid in respect of any time lost thereby. 
Although piracy is not specifically mentioned, the clause does provide that ‘detention of the 
Vessel and/or expenses resulting from such detention shall be for the Charterer’s account’. 
Piracy is not included as an off-hire event.  
 
(c) BOXTIME 
The BOXTIME off-hire clause (used in the container vessel industry) is similar in content to 
the NYPE 93 clause but takes the approach of providing that the vessel remains on-hire 
except for the following circumstances, namely (1) Unable to comply with instructions; (2) 
Deviation; (3) Blocking and trapping; (4) Requisitions; and (5) Loss of time. Loss of time 
only applies where the owners are responsible, and piracy is not mentioned.  
     
(d) GENTIME160  
Consistent with the other standard forms, clause 9 of GENTIME also uses language similar to 
the NYPE 93. Where the vessel is unable to comply with the instructions of the charterers 
due to the listed causes, the vessel goes off-hire for the time thereby lost. Where the vessel 
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deviates for reasons other than to save life or property the vessel goes off-hire. Where the 
vessel ‘alters course to avoid bad weather or be driven into port or anchorage by stress of 
weather, the Vessel shall remain on hire and all costs thereby incurred shall be for the 
Charterers’ account.’ However no mention is made of piracy as a cause of delay which will 
therefore not constitute an off-hire event.  
 
(e) BPTIME 3161 
Clause 19 is the off-hire clause. The vessel is off-hire where there is a loss of time (exceeding 
three hours) where the vessel is unable to comply with the Charterers’ instructions on account 
of various listed causes. Similarly, ‘if the vessel deviates, unless ordered to do so by the 
Charterers, it shall be off-hire from the commencement of such deviation until the Vessel is 
again ready to resume its service from a position not less favourable to Charterers than that at 
which the deviation commenced.’ Where the vessel deviates ‘to avoid bad weather or be 
driven into port or anchorage by stress of weather, the Vessel shall remain on hire and all port 
costs hereby incurred and bunkers consumed shall be for Charterers’ account.’ Piracy is not 
considered an off-hire event.   
 
(f) SHELLTIME 4162 
Clause 21 is the off-hire clause. Where there is loss of time (exceeding three hours) (whether 
by way of interruption in the vessel’s service,  or from reduction in the vessel’s performance, 
or in any other manner) due to the listed causes, off-hire is triggered. Similarly, off-hire is 
triggered when the vessel deviates for the causes listed. Piracy is not considered an off-hire 
event.   
 
WAR RISK CLAUSES 
(g) NYPE 93  
Clause 31 (Protective Clauses) contains, in sub-clause 31(e) the War Clauses. Piracy is 
included as one of the risks under the War Clauses, along with a ‘state of war’, ‘warlike 
operations’, ‘hostilities’, ‘civil strife’, and ‘insurrection’, which give the clause wide 
application. If the owner of the vessel consents to enter a war risk zone, the charterer must 
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pay for additional insurance, deviation and expenses etc. If consent is given by the owners, 
and the charterers pay for additional war risk insurance on loss of hire, then, although the 
vessel does not go off-hire, the owner will be compensated for loss of time due to detention.  
  
(h) BOXTIME 
The BOXTIME ‘War’ clause is set out in clause 19 of the standard form. This clause 
provides that, unless the consent of the owners is obtained, the vessel: 
‘... shall not be ordered to nor obliged to :- (i) remain in or pass through any area which 
is dangerous or is likely to become dangerous as a result of war, ... or piracy, actual or 
threatened, nor ...’    
 
Clause 19.(b) goes on to provide that, should the owners consent to allowing the vessel 
to proceed nothwithstanding the existence of the threats, then the vessel proceeds at the 
owner’s risk but the charterer shall be obliged to reimburse the owner for the following 
insurances, namely: (1) reinstatement of the War Risks cover on Hull and P & I for trading to 
the required area; (2) any further additional premia necessary to maintain hull cover whilst 
blocked or trapped; (3) insurance on hire of the vessel for not exceeding 365 days. Clause 
19.(f) provides that anything done or not done in compliance with these provisions shall not 
be deemed a deviation. Piracy will therefore not take the vessel off-hire, but the owner will be 
covered for hire for a period not exceeding 365 days under the compulsory insurance (if 
indeed insurance cover was taken).    
 
(i) CONWARTIME 1993 and 2004163  
The CONWARTIME 2004 War Risk Clause was one of the few standard war risk clauses 
that actually refers to piracy.
164
 The clause is intended to apply only if such risks arose after 




The 1993 CONWARTIME clause provided as follows: 
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‘War Risks shall include ... acts of piracy ... by any person, body, terrorist or political 
group ... which, in the reasonable judgement of the Master and/or Owners, may be 
dangerous or are likely to be or to become dangerous to the Vessel, her cargo, crew or 
other persons on board the vessel’.  
 
The 2004 update (CONWARTIME/Voywar 2004) was changed to extend the definition 
of piracy as follows: 
‘War Risks” shall include any actual, threatened or reported ... acts of piracy’. 
 
The effect of the CONWARTIME clause is that expenses arising from complying with 
charterer’s orders to trade the vessel through an area at risk of war risks (including piracy) lie 
with charterers.
166
 Williams puts the position as follows: 
‘A number of standard charterparties contain provisions relating to piracy in their war 
risks clauses. A classic example is BIMCO’s CONWARTIME 2004, which addresses 
piracy well in respect of insurance and deviation issues, but remains silent in terms of 
allocation of obligations and responsibilities in relation to hire’.
167
   
 
(j) BPTIME 3     
Clause 30 is the “War Risks” clause in the standard form. The BPTIME 3 form contains 
wording similar to the CONWARTIME clause and does include piracy as one of the war 
risks excluded.
168
 The vessel, unless with consent of the owner, ‘shall not be ordered to or 
required to continue or through any port, place area or zone, where, subject to the reasonable  
judgement of the master, there is a risk of the vessel being exposed to war risks’ (clause 
30.2). Where the owners agree to proceed, the owner may take out additional insurance to 
cover these war risks. If additional premiums are required, these are for the account of the 
charterer.   
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(k) SHELLTIME 4 
The SHELLTIME 4 form deals with war risks in clause 35 but, perhaps surprisingly, the war 
risks do not include piracy amongst those risks.
169
 




In March 2009 BIMCO published its ‘Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties’. The clause 
was drafted in response to industry demand for a comprehensive contractual provision 
dealing with rights, obligations, responsibilities, liabilities and costs related to piracy under a 
time charter.
171
 Following industry experience with these new clauses, further refining of the 
wording took place to more equitably allocate the risk between the parties. BIMCO, in 
November 2009 published a revision to its earlier piracy clause,
172
 providing the following 
reasons: 
‘The reaction to the Clause (the March 2009 BIMCO Piracy Clause) from the industry was 
that it was perceived as being slanted in favour of the owners. The perception stemmed from 
the express provision in the Clause that if the vessel were to be detained by pirates then it 
remained on hire throughout the period of detention. Many charterers felt that with ships 





The BIMCO Piracy Clause addressed a number of issues, including the owner’s 
obligation to follow charterers’ orders, the owners’ right to refuse to proceed with the charter 
if the risk to the vessel and crew is too high, the allocation of costs for additional security and 
insurance (for proceeding through risky areas), and the effect on hire if the vessel is detained 
by pirates.  
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The following key changes (from the March to November 2009 clauses) have been 
introduced: 
 The introduction of a new definition of ‘piracy’ as follows: ‘Any actual, threatened or 
reported acts of piracy and/or violent robbery and/or capture/seizure (hereinafter 
“Piracy”).
174
 ‘Violent robbery’ is now seen as an event of piracy under the BIMCO 
clause. As the BIMCO Special Circular states, ‘It is worth noting that this Clause 
applies whether or not the risk of piracy attack was known at the time the charter was 
concluded or occured afterwards.’
175
 Sara Cockerill asserts that the scope of the 
definition of piracy was extended to include violent robbery ‘... so as to cover 
politically motivated brigands in Nigerian waters who by virtue of political aspect 
would normally fall outside piracy definition’.
176
  
 The introduction of a 90 day cap on the payment of hire should the ship be seized by 
pirates.
177
 Clause (e) of the BIMCO Piracy Clause provides as follows: ‘If the vessel 
is attacked by pirates any time lost
178
 shall be for the account of the Charterers and the 
Vessel shall remain on hire’. 
179
 Clause (f) provides as follows: 
‘If the vessel is seized by pirates the Owners shall keep the Charterers closely 
informed of the efforts made to have the vessel released. The Vessel shall remain on 
hire throughout the seizure and the Charterer’s obligations shall remain unaffected, 
except that hire payments shall cease as of the ninety-first (91st) day after the seizure 
and shall resume once the Vessel is released. The Charterers shall not be liable for 
late redelivery under this Charter Party resulting from seizure of the Vessel by 
pirates.’
180
   
 Time charters generally oblige the charterer to reimburse the owner for any additional 
premiums for additional insurance cover required if the ship is going through any 
dangerous area or an area exposed to the risk of piracy by agreement with the 
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 The clause has been amended to avoid the risk to charterers of double 
insurance i.e. where the charterer has to cover not only its own insurance costs but 
also the costs of the owner.  
 
The incorporation of the BIMCO Piracy Clause into traditional charters brings a number 
of benefits to the charterer: 
 The definition of ‘piracy’ is expanded to include ‘violent robbery’. 
 There is now a cap on the obligation to pay hire of 90 days.182 This represents a 
sharing of the risk of piracy which is not available under the traditional charters.  
 The charterer only pays for piracy and/or war risk insurance once.   
 
In respect of consequential damages flowing from delay caused by an act of piracy, 
Clause (f) of the BIMCO piracy clause provides that ‘The Charterers shall not be liable for 
late redelivery under this Charter Party resulting from seizure of the Vessel by pirates’. This 
also constitutes a benefit to and a shift of the risk away from the charterer – see following 
chapter of this dissertation.   
 
(m) INTERTANKO Time and Voyage 2008183 
The balance in this clause ‘is very much pro Owners’.
184
 Under this clause,
185
 the vessel 
remains on hire if detained by pirates. Andries Kharchanka puts the position as follows: 
‘According to new INTERTANKO “piracy clause” for time and voyage charter parties, 
owners shall not be required to follow charterers orders that the master or owners determine 
would expose the vessel, her crew or cargo to the risk of acts of piracy. The protective 
measures include but not limited to proceeding in convey, using escorts, avoiding day or night 
navigation, adjusting speed or course, or engaging security personel or equipment on or about 
the vessel. Shipowners can nominate an alternative route. The vessel remains on hire for any 
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time lost as a result of taking the defensive measures and for any time spent during or as a 




Therefore all charterer’s obligations including the payment of hire remain in force 
during a capture by pirates. One significant difference (from the BIMCO clause) is that there 
is no 90 day cap-on-hire period, and accordingly if a ship is captured, the charterer remains 





The Cargill ‘Gulf of Aden Clause’ (usually referred to as the ‘GOA Clause’) gives charterers 
the right to order the vessel to transit via the Suez Canal. The clause excludes liability for: 
‘… loss, delay or expense arising from the capture/seizure … detention or threatened detention 
… by third parties which shall always include but not be limited to acts of piracy during the 
performance of lawful voyages’. 
 
The vessel remains on hire, but only for a maximum of 60 days, after which it goes off-
hire and after which the obligation for charterers to pay hire will cease.
188
 This is different 
from the BIMCO piracy clause in that under BIMCO the vessel remains on hire even after the 




(o) Bespoke’ clauses 
It is entirely reasonable for parties to incorporate ‘bespoke’ or ad hoc clauses into their 
agreements. This is often done to cover specific situations in individual hire. One such case 
which came before the courts recently was the The Captain Stefanos.
189
 Clause 56 of the 
charterparty, which also contained the CONWARTIME 2004 clause (see (i) above), provided 
as follows: 
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‘… in the event of loss of time either in port or at sea or deviation … or by reason of refusal 
of the Master or crew to perform their duties, or oil pollution even if alleged, or 
capture/seizure, or detention or threatened detention by any authority including arrest, the hire 
shall be suspended…’ [Emphasis added] 
 
The owners asked the court to interpret this clause in the context of the 
CONWARTIME clause, which placed the risk of piracy on the charterers.
190
 The charterers 
claimed that the words ‘or capture/seizure’ stood alone and should be construed as such.
191
 
The court held that the capture/seizure of the ship by pirates was an off-hire event under the 
specific terms of this contract.
192
 The legal situation is neatly summarised in a note on the 
case by the Charterers P & I Club: 
‘By way of conclusion, we can say that the English courts (not surprisingly) will give full 
legal value to bespoke clauses dealing with detention by pirates notwithstanding the 
incorporation of a CONWARTIME 2004 or similar clause. The crux of this case is however 
whether the words used in the off-hire clause were sufficiently clear to allocate the risk of 
seizure by pirates with the Owners.’
193
     
   
II SUMMARY OF CLAUSES 
It may be useful to summarise the forms/clauses by grouping them into those which do not 
provide for events of piracy; those which specifically provide for events of piracy; and then 
those which relieve the charterer of the obligation to pay hire consequent on an event of 
piracy. 
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(a) Forms/clauses which do not provide for events of piracy  







 GENTIME (clause 19), SHELLTIME 4 (clause 21),
197
 and the War 
Risk clause in SHELLTIME 4 do not contain any reference to acts of piracy. Consequently, 
under these clauses, the vessel would not go off-hire as a consequence of piracy.  
 
(b) Forms/clauses which do contain references to piracy,vessel remains on-hire, and 
charterer remains liable to pay hire 
The War clause in the NYPE 93 (clause 31 (e)) provides that the vessel cannot enter any port 
or zone where piracy may exist. If consent is given, charterers will pay the additional cost of 
insurance (hull war risks and war risk insurance) and additional wages and bonuses (if 
existence of conditions arise after date of charter). The vessel will not go off-hire. If consent 
is given by the owners, and the charterers pay for additional war risk insurance on loss of 
hire, then, although the vessel does not go off-hire, the owner will be compensated for loss of 
time due to detention. Similarly the BOXTIME war clause also includes piracy as part of this 
definition. Unless the consent of the owners is obtained, the vessel cannot be ordered or 
obliged to pass through any piracy area. If the owner consents, vessel proceeds at owner’s 
risk but charterer reimburses owners for costs of  war risks cover on hull, further insurance, 
and insurance on hire. Similarly to the NYPE 93, the vessel under this clause also does not go 
off-hire; owner will be covered for hire for a period not exceeding 365 days under the 
compulsory insurance provisions.  
 
The BPTIME 3 war risk clause also includes piracy as a war risk. Under this clause, the 
vessel, unless with consent of the owner, shall not be ordered to or required to continue or 
through any port, place area or zone, where, subject to the reasonable judgement of the 
master, there is a risk of the vessel being exposed to war risks. Where the owners agree to 
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proceed, the owner may take out additional insurance to cover these war risks. If additional 
premiums are required, these are for the account of the charterer. The vessel does not go off-
hire. CONWARTIME 93 also includes piracy as a war risk. In this case the vessel cannot be 
ordered to continue to any war risk zone. Charterer pays additional insurance premiums if 
vessel enters zone as well as crew bonuses or wages. The vessel does not go off-hire. The 
CONWARTIME 2004 is similar. INTERTANKO also contains a separate piracy clause, here 
the owner shall not be required to follow the charterer’s orders that expose vessel to piracy. If 
it can take a safe route, the additional costs are for charterer. Vessel remains on hire during 
actual or threatened attack or detention by pirates. Charterer indemnifies, and pays additional 
costs. 
 
(c) Forms/clauses where the charterer is relieved of the obligation to pay hire 
The BIMCO 2009 is one of the few separately-standing piracy clauses. Under this clause, the 
vessel is not obliged to proceed through dangerous areas due to piracy. If it proceeds (under 
the charterer’s orders), the charterer indemnifies owner. The charterer pays additional costs 
(personnel and preventative measures) plus crew bonuses, additional wages and additional 
insurance premiums. If the vessel is attacked by pirates, it remains on-hire but hire payments 
shall cease as of 91
st
 day. In such a case, the vessel remains on-hire but the charterer is 
relieved from paying hire after 90 days. GOA also contains a piracy clause; here the vessel 
remains on-hire for a maximum of 60 days after detention by piracy. 
  
III CONCLUSION 
As can be seen, time charter agreements and their clauses have developed over time to 
address piracy risks, but the progression has not always benefitted the charterer. The position 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
Traditional charters – No reference is made to piracy. Courts have held that piracy does not 
constitute an off-hire event under the off-hire clauses in traditional charters. 
 
Recent off-hire clauses – No reference is made to piracy specifically as an event leading to 
off-hire under the more recent off-hire clauses. 
 
Recent war risk clauses – Piracy is included as a war risk in the clauses surveyed. The 












insurance premiums if vessel enters zone (on instruction of charterer) as well as crew bonuses 
or wages. The war risk clauses generally protect the owner’s position, and do not take the 
vessel off-hire consequent on piracy, therefore providing no benefit to the charterer (in 
respect of loss of time). 
 
Piracy clauses – The piracy clauses represent a mixed bag for the charterer. The BIMCO 
piracy clause does more equitably allocate the risk between the parties. It addresses a number 
of issues, including the owner’s obligation to follow charterers’ orders, the owners’ right to 
refuse to proceed with the charter if the risk to the vessel and crew is too high, the allocation 
of costs for additional security and insurance (for proceeding through pirate infested areas), 
and the effect on hire if the vessel is detained by pirates. Importantly, it introduces a 90 day 
cap on the payment of hire should the ship be seized by pirates. The vessel remains on hire; it 
is the payment of hire that is suspended. Similarly the GOA piracy clause provides that the 
vessel remains on-hire for a maximum of 60 days following detention by pirates, and then 
goes off-hire. However other piracy clauses, such as that introduced by INTERTANKO, 
remain ‘pro owner’ and under this clause, the vessel remains on-hire if detained by pirates.  
 
Bespoke clauses – Bespoke clauses are becoming more popular where the charterer has 
negotiating power, such as when the shipping industry is in a slump. Such a special clause 
was upheld in The Captain Stefanos
198
 where the court held that the capture/seizure of the 
ship by pirates was an off-hire event under the specific wording of a bespoke capture/seizure  
clause.  
 
The obligation therefore remains on the charterer to try to find the balance during the 
commercial negotiations which lead up to the charter. It is obviously in the charterer’s 
interests to push for the incorporation of piracy clauses which offer the most advantage. 
Alternatively the charterer should propose ‘bespoke’ clauses which are relevant to the 
particular hire circumstances to protect his position. Whether the charterer succeeds or not is 
a function of a complex set of circumstances which exist in each case, and which are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.
199
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CHAPTER IX  DAMAGES DUE TO DELAY ON REDELIVERY  
The risks of losses being suffered by a time charterer as a result of delay caused by piracy are 
liability for hire while the vessel is not ‘working’ and potential damages for breach of the 
obligation to redeliver at the stipulated time. The previous chapter of this dissertation has 
dealt with the first liability i.e. liability for hire and this chapter deals with the latter risk i.e. 
potential damages for breach if the obligation to redeliver at the stipulated time is not met. 
Delays caused by acts of piracy can therefore have financial implications for time charterers 
beyond having to pay hire while the vessel is not working.  
 
I SEPARATE BUT RELATED RISKS 
Any loss of time caused by acts of piracy may cause the late redelivery of the vessel back to 
the owner and the owner’s subsequent delayed delivery to the next charterer. The cause of the 
late redelivery in such a case is the loss of time due to piracy. The risks of losses suffered by 
a time charterer resulting from loss of time due to piracy and potential damage for the breach 
of the obligation to redeliver at the stipulated time are therefore separate but related. These 
two related risks are managed by different clauses in the time charter forms. It is considered 
appropriate to address this additional risk to the time charterer (of potential damages for late 
delivery) in this dissertation to assess whether there has been any realignment of the 
charterer’s risk in this regard arising from piracy and flowing from the introduction of more 
recent standard forms and/or piracy clauses in relation to the obligation to redeliver. Has the 
charterer’s position improved in this respect i.e. has there been a realignment of risk away 
from the charterer in the case of piracy? As will be seen, at least one piracy clause has 
improved the charterer’s position, demonstrating that this is a valid issue to research and 
include in this dissertation.  
 
This additional potential liability of the owner claiming damages as a result of loss of 
fixture (i.e. breach of the obligation to redeliver) is another reason why time charterers ought 
to carefully consider their contractual position flowing from the increased risk of piracy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        













II CONTRACTUAL MANAGEMENT OF THE REDELIVERY RISK 
As has been shown previously, under a time charter agreement, the charterer hires the vessel 
from the owner for an agreed rate and period. The contract of charterparty imposes strict 
obligations on the charterer to pay hire from delivery of the vessel until the vessel is again 
redelivered to the owner. In general shipping commerce, the owner makes a living by 
chartering the vessel to numerous charterers and, because ‘time is money’, the owner has an 
interest in ensuring that there is the minimum turnaround time between receiving the vessel 
back from one charterer and making it available to the next charterer. What is the charterer’s 




It is considered convenient to distinguish between the express contractual provisions 
(in the time charter forms) seeking to regulate breaches of contract and or damages for such 
breach, and the general contractual law principles relating to entitlement to damages for 
breach of contract and the measure of those damages.  
 
III EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 
Clause 7 of the BALTIME 1939 (as revised 2001) is the ‘Re-delivery’ clause in this form. 
This clause provides that the vessel ‘shall be re-delivered on the expiration of the Charter in 
the same good order as when delivered to the Charterers …’. Further, the clause provides that 
‘should the Vessel be ordered on a voyage by which the Charter period will be exceeded the 
Charterers shall have the use of the Vessel to enable them to complete the voyage, provided it 
could be reasonably calculated that the voyage would allow redelivery about the time fixed 
for the termination of the Charter, but for any time exceeding the termination date the 
Charterers shall pay the market rate if higher than the rate stipulated herein.’ There is no 
contractual damages clause. Piracy is included as a ‘War Risk’ under clause 20 
(“CONWARTIME 1993”)) but does not take the vessel off-hire under the ‘Suspension of 
Hire’ clause (clause 11 (A)).  The owner will therefore have to rely on his common law right 
to claim damages for breach of the obligation to re-deliver. 
 
The NYPE 46 does not contain a separate re-delivery clause, providing for a time of 
delivery and re-delivery in the preamble and, in clause 4, providing that ‘Charterers are to 
give owners not less than [ Blank ] days’ notice of vessels expected date of re-delivery, and 
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probable port’. The NYPE 1993 contains similar wording in clause 10 – ‘Rate of 
Hire/Redelivery Areas and Notices’. Piracy is not included as a cause which takes the vessel 
off-hire under clause 17 (‘Off Hire’) of the NYPE 1993. The owner will therefore have to 
rely on his common law right to claim damages for breach of the obligation to re-deliver. 
 
Clause 4 of GENTIME is the ‘Redelivery’ clause. This provides for the ‘Redelivery 
Place’, the ‘Acceptance of Redelivery’, ‘Notice’ and ‘Last Voyage’. Under the ‘Last Voyage’ 
provision (clause 4(d)), the charterers warrant that they will not commence a voyage which 
cannot reasonably be expected to be completed in the time allowed for redelivery,
201
 and the 
clause goes on to read as follows: 
‘If, nevertheless, such an order is given, the Owners shall have the option: (i) to refuse the order 
and require a substitute order allowing timely redelivery; (ii) to perform the order without 
prejudice to their rights to claim damages for breach of charter in case of late redelivery. In any 
event, for the number of days by which the period agreed and declared as per clause 1(a) is 
exceeded, the Charterers shall pay the market rate if this is higher than the rate stated in Box 
24.’         
 
Piracy is included as a ‘War Risk (‘Appendix A – Protective Clauses’) but does not 
take the vessel off-hire under the ‘Off-hire’ clause (clause 9). The owner in this case can rely 
on his contractual right to claim damages for breach of the obligation to re-deliver. 
 
BPTIME 3 also contains a ‘Redelivery’ clause (clause 3). This provides that the vessel 
‘must be redelivered to Owners at Place of Redelivery stipulated in Part 1, Section F on the 
expiry of the Charter period, …’. There are exceptions made for ballast and laden voyages 
(clause 3.2). Piracy is included as a ‘War Risk’ (clause 30.1.2) but does not take the vessel 
off-hire under clause 19. There is no contractual damages clause. The owner will therefore 
have to rely on his common law right to claim damages for breach of the obligation to re-
deliver. 
 
The SHELLTIME 4 contract does not contain a separate re-delivery clause; rather 
clause 4(a)(f) provides that ‘… and Charterers are required to give owners prior notice of 
redelivery.’ Again the owner’s claim for damages will have to be found in common law. 
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It was only with the introduction of the BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 
2009 that a realignment of risk in favour of the charterer (in this context) took place. Clause 
(f) provides as follows: 
‘If the Vessel is seized by pirates the Owners shall keep the Charterers closely informed of the 
efforts made to have the Vessel released. The Vessel shall remain on hire throughout the 
seizure and the Charterers’ obligations shall remain unaffected, except that hire payments shall 
cease as of the ninety-first (91st) day after the seizure and shall resume once the Vessel is 
released. The Charterers shall not be liable for late redelivery under this Charter Party resulting 
from seizure of the Vessel by pirates.’ 
 
The result is that, under the latest BIMCO Piracy Clause, the charterer is not liable for 
late delivery resulting from detention of the ship by pirates. The owner will therefore not 
have a claim for damages in such a case.  
 
IV  GENERAL CONTRACTUAL LAW PRINCIPLES 
The measure of damages is not peculiar to charterparties. It is a general contractual principle 
that is simply being applied in the instance of charterparties. The cases referred to in this 
section in support of this proposition are English cases. This is not surprising since most time 
charterparties have English law as there chosen law.
202
 Professor Hare in discussing the 
measure of damages in charterparty claims, comments as follows: 
‘South African law has inherited the criteria applied to the measure of damages arising from 
one party’s breach of contract from English law, espoused in Hadley v Baxendale.’
203
   
 
Hutchison confirms this position, recording that: 
‘The traditional test used in the remoteness enquiry was adopted by the Appellate Division in 
Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156…. In the main judgement given in Lavery, 
Curlewis JA imported the English law approach to remoteness, the so-called ‘rule in Hadley v 
Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341.’
204
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In general, failure to redeliver timeously will give the owner a right to claim damages 
resulting from the breach of a contractual term. Taylor sets out the position as follows: 
‘Thus, once it has been determined that damage or loss has been caused by the defaulting party, 





As Andrew Taylor asserts, ‘The basic principles governing the recoverability of 
contractual damages have, for many years, remained intact, and the general thinking 
supporting those principles, undisturbed’.
206
 The general rule with regards to damages 
remains that damages are recoverable provided they are foreseeable and not too remote.
207
 
The rule in Hadley v Baxendale
208
 is that: 
‘Whether a claim is too remote or not involves a consideration of what losses would be in the 
parties’ contemplation as a result of the alleged breach, i.e. what would be reasonably 
foreseeable. Accordingly, unless special factors are brought to the attention of the contract-
breaker, the loss to be recoverable must be such as would be considered, at the time of entering 
into the charter, as a not unlikely consequence of the breach’.  
 
This principle was explained in The Achilleas.
209
 Here the vessel was time chartered for 
a period of five to seven months on the NYPE 1946 form. An addendum to the charter 
extended the period of hire for a further five to seven months at a daily rate of US$16 750. 
This addendum stated that the latest day for delivery was 2 May 2004.   
‘By April 2004, market rates had more than doubled compared with the previous September. 
On 20 April 2004 the charterers gave notice of redelivery between 30 April and 2 May 2004. 
On the following day, the owners fixed the vessel for a new four to six month hire to another 
charterer, following on from the current charter, at a daily rate of US$39 500. The latest date 
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Close to the date of redelivery the charterers entered into a sub-charter with another 
charterer. The vessel due to delay was re-delivered late and as a result the owners lost the 
new fixture. Claiming ‘damages for the loss of the difference between the original rate and 
the reduced rate over the period of the fixture, at US$8 000 a day, which came to US$1 364 
584.37’.  
 
Charterers countered this by relying on the well-established rule in Hadley v 
Baxendale as arising ‘naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach 
of contract itself’. The arbitrators, High Court and Court of Appeal all found in the owner’s 
favour awarding them the full loss of profit for the new fixture. On Appeal to the House of 
Lords this decision was overturned and the charterers were only liable for those damages 
which were reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course i.e. those damages in line with the 
rule in Hadley v Baxendale.  
 
Hutchison, in a recent article in the South African Law Journal, makes the point that: 
‘A close reading of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale reveals that it is in fact two rules, the first 
dealing with the position where damages ‘arise naturally according to the usual course of 
things’ and the second from where the damages could ‘reasonably be supposed to have been 
within the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract’.
211
   
 
For South African courts the first rule applies to general damages and the second to 
special damages. To succeed in a claim for special damages, the ‘defendant must also have 
accepted liability for this type of damage at the time of contracting…. This represents an 
embellishment of the Hadley principle and came to be known as the ‘convention principle.’
212
 
Hutchison then proceeds to show that the English law has also developed since the Hadley 
case, and summarises the South African legal position as follows: 
‘Thus, in sum, English law is the origin of the current South African position on remoteness in 
contract with the exception of the convention principle, which appears to have developed 
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V CONCLUSION  
In accordance with general contractual law principles governing damages, the charterer 
would only be liable for those damages which were reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary 
course as a result of delay caused by piracy.
214
 Where the owner has an express contractual 
right to claim damages (such as in BALTIME), the owner would have to show the damages 
actually suffered were reasonably foreseeable. But there is one case where the owner 
contractually gives up its right to claim damages, and that is BIMCO 2009. In this case the 
parties specifically contract (their bargain) that, ‘[T]he Charterers shall not be liable for late 
redelivery under this Charter Party resulting from seizure of the Vessel by pirates’. This 
constitutes a contractual benefit to and a shift of the risk of potentially paying damages away 
from the charterer, which is not available under the other traditional charters or more recent 
standard forms. It is likely (i.e. it ‘will happen in the majority of cases’) that a vessel detained 
through an act of piracy will result, for example, in an owner missing a sub-fixture. 
Charterers therefore run the risk of owners’ claiming damages in such an eventuality, unless 
they have adopted clauses similar to the BIMCO piracy clause which excludes such liability.     
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CHAPTER X  CONCLUSION 
Under traditional time charter contracts, which are still in common use, South African time 
charterers, as with time charterers around the world but perhaps more pressingly so given the 
geographical proximity of the threat of pirate attacks, carry the risk of losses arising out of 
delays caused by pirate attacks both in the form of liability for hire while the ship is not 
operating and potentially liability for damages for late redelivery of the chartered vessel.  
 
Traditional off-hire clauses have generally been held by the courts not to include piracy as a 
ground for off-hire. And the introduction of war risk clauses, which in most cases include 
piracy,  have done little to assist the charterer as, in all cases, they do not take the vessel off-
hire. With the adaptation of these traditional charters over time and the generation of a variety 
of specific clauses to deal with this issue, charterers now have a limited array of contractual 
mechanisms to choose from to try to ensure a more equitable distribution of these losses as 
between themselves and owners, provided, of course, they have the bargaining power to 
negotiate the inclusion of these clauses. In such a case, bespoke piracy or ‘seizure and 
detention’ clauses are also possible. And then there is insurance.  
 
The forms/clauses reviewed present a mixed bag of options for the charterer. ‘Doing nothing’ 
and going with the traditional charters only results in exposure. Then the charterer may take a 
chance by adding one word (‘any other cause whatsoever’) to the standard off-hire clauses 
which will hopefully (based on precedent) bring piracy into the wording of the particular off-
hire clause. Relying on the more recently introduced war risk clauses (which generally serve 
to protect the owner’s position) does not advance the charterer’s position unless specific 
insurance is taken out (and then at the charterer’s cost). It is only the (relatively recent) 
BIMCO and GOA piracy clauses which partly realign the risk of piracy by suspending the 
payment of hire (albeit after 90 and 60 days respectively have passed) (but in the case of 
BIMCO also not taking the vessel off-hire); and it is only the BIMCO clause (from amongst 
the standard forms surveyed) which removes the threat from the charterer from also being 














Ince and Co report that, ‘[W]ith one notable exception (The Bow Asir, released after 15 days) 
the benchmark period for capture remains around two months’.
215
 The likely result is 
therefore that, even with the inclusion of the recent piracy clauses, the benefit to the charterer 
in most cases of actual piracy will probably be limited because the vessel is likely to be 
released before the charterer’s liability to pay hire ceases.   
 
Whether the charterer succeeds in introducing clauses to protect its position in the event of 
piracy therefore depends on a complex number of factors, such as the commercial 
relationship between the parties, the bargaining position of the parties, external market 
conditions (i.e. supply and demand at the time), appreciation of the risks, negotiating power 
and bespoke insurance.
216
 And, lastly and importantly, will charterers look beyond their 
familiar position of ‘doing nothing’ and go with the traditional charters or rather insist on 
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 Ince and Company, available at http://incelaw.com/whatwedo/shipping/article/shipping-e-brief-may-
2009/piracy-an-overview-and-update, accessed on 15 June 2013. 
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ANNEX A - SELECTED PIRACY CLAUSES 
BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009 
(a) The Vessel shall not be obliged to proceed or required to continue to or through, any port, place, 
area or zone, or any waterway or canal (hereinafter “Area”) which, in the reasonable judgement of the 
Master and/or the Owners, is dangerous to the Vessel, her cargo, crew or other persons on board the 
Vessel due to any actual, threatened or reported acts of piracy and/or violent robbery and/or 
capture/seizure (hereinafter “Piracy”), whether such risk existed at the time of entering into this 
charter party or occurred thereafter. Should the Vessel be within any such place as aforesaid which 
only becomes dangerous, or is likely to be or to become dangerous, after her entry into it, she shall be 
at liberty to leave it.  
 
(b) If in accordance with sub-clause (a) the Owners decide that the Vessel shall not proceed or 
continue to or through the Area they must immediately inform the Charterers. The Charterers shall be 
obliged to issue alternative voyage orders and shall indemnify the Owners for any claims from holders 
of the Bills of Lading caused by waiting for such orders and/or the performance of an alternative 
voyage. Any time lost as a result of complying with such orders shall not be considered off-hire. 
 
(c) If the Owners consent or if the Vessel proceeds to or through an Area exposed to the risk of Piracy 
the Owners shall have the liberty: 
(i) to take reasonable preventative measures to protect the Vessel, her crew and cargo 
including but not limited to re-routeing within the Area, proceeding in convoy, using escorts, 
avoiding day or night navigation, adjusting speed or course, or engaging security personnel or 
equipment on or about the Vessel; 
 
(ii) to comply with the orders, directions or recommendations of any underwriters who have 
the authority to give the same under the terms of the insurance; 
 
(iii) to comply with all orders, directions, recommendations or advice given by the 
Government of the Nation under whose flag the Vessel sails, or other Government to whose 
laws the Owners are subject, or any other Government, body or group, including military 
authorities, whatsoever acting with the power to compel compliance with their orders or 
directions; and 
 
(iv) to comply with the terms of any resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations, 












same, and with national laws aimed at enforcing the same to which the Owners are subject, 
and to obey the orders and directions of those who are charged with their enforcement; 
 
and the Charterers shall indemnify the Owners for any claims from holders of Bills of Lading 
or third parties caused by the Vessel proceeding as aforesaid, save to the extent that such claims 
are covered by additional insurance as provided in sub-clause (d)(iii). 
 
(d) Costs 
(i) If the Vessel proceeds to or through an Area where due to risk of Piracy additional costs 
will be incurred including but not limited to additional personnel and preventative Measures 
to avoid Piracy, such reasonable costs shall be for the Charterers’ account. Any time lost 
waiting for convoys, following recommended routeing, timing, or reducing speed or taking 
measures to minimise risk, shall be for the Charterers’ account and the Vessel shall remain on 
hire; 
 
(ii) If the Owners become liable under the terms of employment to pay to the crew any bonus 
or additional wages in respect of sailing into an area which is dangerous in the manner 
defined by the said terms, then the actual bonus or additional wages paid shall be reimbursed 
to the Owners by the Charterers; 
 
(iii) If the underwriters of the Owners’ insurances require additional premiums or additional 
insurance cover is necessary because the Vessel proceeds to or through an Area exposed to 
risk of Piracy, then such additional insurance costs shall be reimbursed by the Charterers to 
the Owners; 
 
(iv) All payments arising under Sub-clause (d) shall be settled within fifteen (15) days of 
receipt of Owners’ supported invoices or on redelivery, whichever occurs first. 
 
(e) If the Vessel is attacked by pirates any time lost shall be for the account of the Charterers and the 
Vessel shall remain on hire. 
 
(f) If the Vessel is seized by pirates the Owners shall keep the Charterers closely informed of the 
efforts made to have the Vessel released. The Vessel shall remain on hire throughout the seizure and 
the Charterers’ obligations shall remain unaffected, except that hire payments shall cease as of the 
ninety-first (91st) day after the seizure and shall resume once the Vessel is released. The Charterers 














(g) If in compliance with this Clause anything is done or not done, such shall not be deemed a 
deviation, but shall be considered as due fulfilment of this Charter Party. In the event of a conflict 
between the provisions of this Clause and any implied or express provision of the Charter Party, this 
Clause shall prevail to the extent of such conflict, but no further. 
 
INTERTANKO Piracy Clause – Time Charterparties 
1.       Owners shall not be required to follow Charterers’ orders that the Master or Owners determine 
would expose the vessel, her crew or cargo to the risk of acts of piracy. 
2.       Owners shall be entitled   
(a)    to take reasonable preventive measures to protect the vessel, her crew and cargo including 
but not limited to proceeding in convoy, using escorts, avoiding day or night navigation, 
adjusting speed or course, or engaging security personnel or equipment on or about the vessel,   
(b)    to follow any instructions or recommendations given by the flag state, any governmental 
or supragovernmental organisation and 
(c)    to take a safe and reasonable alternative route in place of the normal, direct or intended 
route to the next port of call, in which case Owners shall give Charterers prompt notice of the 
alternative route, an estimate of time and bunker consumption and a revised estimated time of 
arrival.  
3.       The vessel shall remain on hire for any time lost as a result of taking the measures referred to in 
Paragraph 2 of this Clause and for any time spent during or as a result of an actual or threatened attack 
or detention by pirates.  
4.       Charterers shall indemnify Owners against all liabilities costs and expenses arising out of actual 
or threatened acts of piracy or any preventive or other measures taken by Owners whether pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of this Clause or otherwise, including but not limited to additional insurance premiums, 
additional crew costs and costs of security personnel or equipment.  
5.       Charterers warrant that the terms of this Clause will be incorporated effectively into any bill of 
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